College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1986

Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer
Relations
Peter A. Alces
William & Mary Law School, paalce@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Alces, Peter A., "Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations" (1986). Faculty Publications. 299.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/299

Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
VOLUME

32

SUMMER

1986

NUMBER

4

TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF
BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONS
PETER A. ALCESt
I.

INTRODUCTION

This is an Article about contradictions. First, there is the
oxymoron suggested by the title: we are not used to so flagrant
a juxtaposition of the theoretical, "jurisprudence," with the practical, the interstices of the bank-customer relationship. Second,
contemporary payments law presents contradictory, often confusing, legislative predispositions. Articles 31 and 42 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which govern the negotiation, payment,
and collection of checks,3 are particularly indulgent of the rights
t Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. A.B. 1977,
Lafayette College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. A substantial portion of this
Article was written while the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor at the
University of Texas School of Law, during the Summer of 1985. I am grateful
to Professors Douglas Laycock, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook for
their helpful comments on early drafts of the manuscript, but it would be
inappropriate to burden them with blame for any inadequacies of the finished
product. I am not, however, reluctant to share the blame (and even some of the
glory) with my research assistants, Robert G. Boliek, Jr., Virginia Patterson,
Vanessa Stoner, and Maeveen Behan.
1. Although there is no specific "scope" provision in Article 3, § 3-101 of
the Uniform Commerical Code (U.C.C.) sets forth the short title of the Article:
"This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial CodeCommercial Paper." U.C.C. § 3-101 (1977). Limitations to the scope of the
Article are provided in § 3-103. Money, documents of title, and investment
securities are specifically excluded, and the Article is explicitly made subject to
the provisions of Articles 4 and 9. See id. § 3-103.
2. There is no specific "scope" section to Article 4. However, § 4-101
sets forth the short title of the Article: "This Article shall be known and may
be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Bank Deposits and Collections." !d. §
4-101. Moreover, in the case of conflict between the provisions of Articles 3 and
4, the Article 4 provisions will govern. See id. §§ 3-103(2), 4-102(1) & comment
1.

3. Checks, as traditionally processed, clearly fit within the Article 4
definition of "items": negotiable and nonnegotiable paper calling for the payment
of money. See id. § 4-104(1)(g) & comment 4. The increasing use of electronic
transfer messages in the check collection system has lead to questions regarding
the continued application of Article 4 to modem bank collection practice. "The
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of financial institutions. 4 Conversely, the law governing electronic
fund transfers5 and credit cards6 is clearly a product of the consumer

conclusion that Article 4 is inapplicable to evolving payment systems is based
primarily on the view that a stored electronic payment message does not fit the
UCC definition of an 'item' .... " Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the
True Codification of Payments Law, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83, 85 n.7 (1984)
(citing Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979); Jetton, Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp.: Consequential Damages for Bank Negligence in Wire Transfers, 9 RuTGERS
CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369, 398 & n.127 (1983)). For further discussion of the
potential obsolescence of Articles 3 and 4, see Dunne, The Checkless Society
and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAw. 127, 127-28 (1968); Penney, Articles 4 and
8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 259, 264 (1966); Penney,
Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65
MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1357-60 (1967). See generally Dunne, Variation on a Theme
by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Checkless Society, 15 YALE L.J. 788 (1966) (system of check use is inefficient).
But see Clarke, An Item is an Item is an Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C. and the
Electronic Age, 25 Bus. LAW. 109 (1969) (Article 4 can accommodate the issues
presented by new payment systems).
4. Many commentators have noted the bias of Article 4 towards the
rights of financial institutions. See, e.g. , Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?]
Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 357-63 (1952);
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE
L.J. 364, 374-79 (1952); Leary & Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good
News from Articles Three and Four, 43 OHio ST. L.J. 611, 613-15 (1982);
McDonnell, Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks: The Clash of the Utilitarian
and Paternalist Creeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 GEo. L.J. 1399,
1409-13 (1985). But cf. Pape, Stop Payment in the Uniform New Payments Code,
9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 353, 353 & n.3 (1983) (suggesting that the
U.C.C., at least in regard to stop payment orders, takes a "balancing" approach
between the rights of consumers and the rights of banks).
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982) (codifying as amended the Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (E.F.T.A.)). The purpose of the Act is to
provide "a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities
of participants in electronic fund transfer systems . . . [and to provide for]
individual consumer rights." /d. § 1693(b) (emphasis added). For further discussion
of the E.F.T.A., see Brandel & Olliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A
Primer, 40 OHio ST. L.J . 531 (1979); Fox, Another Step Toward the Cashless
Society? The 1978 Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 209
(1980); Schellie, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 1441 (1979); Taffer,
The Making of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer Liability
and Error Resolution, 13 U.S.F.L. REv. 231 (1979).
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (codifying
as amended the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1).29 (1986)
(Regulation Z). Regulation Z establishes liability limits for holders of credit cards,
id. § 226.12(b)(1), delineates procedures for dealing with credit card disputes, id.
§ 226.13(c))(d), and describes the information that must be given to customers
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movement. Why the law supporting different payment modes
should proceed from two diametrically opposed frames of reference
is not intuitively obvious. In fact, given the essential similarities
among the available payment media, such stark opposition is
counter-intuitive and intimates the operation of forces not immediately apparent.
Good sense may be made in the course of attempting to
reconcile those contradictions. There is no alchemy involved in
expounding a jurisprudence of the relationship between a financial
institution and its customer. Karl Llewellyn, principal architect of
the UCC, explained the roles of jurisprudential inquiry by suggesting that investigation of legal matters' may be pursued on three
levels: jurisprudence for the hundred, for the hundred thousand,
and for the hundred million. 8 He had no real interest in sustained
ratiocinations that would only excite the hundred, "the more
esoteric tradition of the writers about the writers and for the
writers . . . in the language or in the general tradition of professional philosophy. " 9 Llewellyn's thesis, as ultimately executed in
Article 2 of the UCC, required focus on the other two levels,
jurisprudence for the hundred thousand and for the hundred
million. "Jurisprudence for the hundred thousand" formulates the

in their periodic statements, id. § 226.7. See generally Weistart, Consumer
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 10 MICH.
L. REv. 1475 (1972) (discussing statutes and regulations governing credit cards);
Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 11 Yale L.J. 1418 (1968) (discussing
legislation dealing with credit card fraud). The Fair Credit Billing Act establishes
procedures for the resolution of credit card billing errors. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1666-1666j; N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER
SYSTEMS 1 10.02[21[d], at 1()..32 to -34 (1980). These laws are more solicitous
of certain consumer rights than is Article 4. See Alces, supra note 3, at 96 (citing
Nimmer, Consumer Payment Systems: Leverage Effects Within An Electronic
Funds Transfer System, 17 Hous. L. REv. 487, 507-09 (1980)).
7. Llewellyn was mindful not to unnecessarily narrow the scope of the
concept of "law," see Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
CoLUM. L. REv. 431, 432 (1930), specifically stating: "I have no desire to exclude
anything from matters legal.'' /d. at 432.
8. See K. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society (1950) (unpublished course
materials) reprinted in part in W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MoVEMENT 499-500 (1973); see also id. at 173 ("Llewellyn distinguished between
'jurisprudence for the hundred', 'jurisprudence for the hundred thousand', ...
and 'jurisprudence for the hundred million."').
9. K. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 499; see also W. TWINING, supra note
8, at 173 ("In a very high proportion of [Llewellyn's] teaching and writing he
denied, not always convincingly, that he was concerned with 'jurisprudence for
the hundred' and claimed to be operating at the level of 'jurisprudence for the
hundred thousand."').
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concentration of Llewellyn's writing: "for the Bar in daily living,
and for the citizen who is willing to take a moment off to
ponder. . . . 'Almost any rule of law can be put into language an
ordinary man can understand.' The same is true of problems about
law. Both jobs badly need doing." 10 This Article assumes that
meaningful examination of commercial issues must proceed from
the perspective of the hundred thousand; if the UCC fails that
group, it cannot hope to secure the ''hundred million,'' the citizenry
at large.'' The bank customer, then, should be able to understand
what the bank is doing and why, and a sound jurisprudence of
the bank-customer relationship ought to derive from such a ''realistic" perspective.
Even those who are able to come to terms with the relationship
between jurisprudence and commercial transactions will be troubled
by the second apparent contradiction: the inconsistent treatment
of similar transactions occasioned by the divergent legislative perspectives from which our payments law has developed. The UCC,
particularly in Article 4, serves the interests of financial institutions.
Therefore, the consumer who pays by a draft drawn on a bank
is subject to the institutional bias of uniform state check collection
law. If that same consumer uses a Visa or Master Card check,
federal law may 12 govern and offer protection mechanisms nowhere
contemplated by the drafters of the UCC. While the source of
this contradiction can and will be explained, the disparate treatment
of largely indistinguishable payments media cannot be rationalized.
The American Law Instit11te (ALI) 13 and the National Conference

10. K. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 500.
11. Llewellyn stated: "Men . . . can understand the guts of Jurisprudence. . . . (The bank clerk and the Negotiable Instruments Law. The warehouseman and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. The union and the Wagner
Act.-The citizen in general?)" /d.
12. "Visa checks" are one type of modern payment device about which
current law is uncertain and contradictory. They are furnished to cardholders by
the issuer or financial institution and they permit the cardholder to write checks
against his line of credit. Substantial questions have arisen concerning the law
applicable to this new payment device. See Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson
to the 1983 Uniform New Payments Code Invitational Conference (Sept. 30,
1983) (Should "MasterChecking" be treated as a method of payment or an
extension of credit, a check loan, or a credit card cash advance?) (on file at The
Wayne Law Review).
13. The American Law Institute (ALI) had its origins in a committee
organized in 1921 under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools.
This initial committee reported in 1922 and recommended the foundation of a
permanent body, the ALI. The ALI's first project was to be a Restatement of
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of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) 14 joined
in support of the Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.) 15
project to develop a comprehensive statute that would treat similar
media similarly. The deterioration of that project informs the
analysis developed here. 16
This Article will compare the equities claimed in support of
both the profmandal and consumer-protectionist payments legislation. First, the check law of the UCC is compared to federal
electronic fund transfer law by focusing on the liability of financial
institutions for paying over a valid stop order. Then, the jurisprudential foundations of the most Llewellynesque portions of the
vee are explored to formulate the impact of legal realism on
commercial codification. The substance of Article 2 rules reveals
the unique perspective of the realistic approach and the development
of commercial law along lines consistent with tort, rather than
contract, principles. Finally, this Article will demonstrate that
thoughtful jurisprudential analysis is a crucial prerequisite to the
promulgation of coherent commerical law. The Article concludes
that the application of realistic principles to payments legislation
best accommodates the interests of banks as well as their customers.
The use of realistic principles as a foundation for future codification
efforts can resolve the imbalances prevalent in existing law by
establishing an intermediate position between the two extremes.
There is room for true consensus.
the Law. See W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 273-74. See generally Goodrich, The
Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283 (history and
overview of ALI activities); Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and
the First Restatement of the Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE CouRTS 1 (1945)
(discussing evolution of ALI and Restatement).
14. The N.C.C.U.S.L. was founded in 1892 and is comprised of unpaid
commissioners appointed by state governors and responsible for preparing legislation for possible adoption by state legislatures. W. TWINING, supra note 8,
at 272. See generally Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CoNTE~fP. PROBS. 233 (1965)
(discussion of unification of law in U.S.).
15. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE (perm. ed. bd. draft no. 3, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.]. The U.N.P.C. was to be preemptive payments
legislation. Indeed, the U.N.P.C. was drafted to apply to "any orders funds
[sic] payable by or at, or transmitted by or to, an account institution." /d. §
2(1) (emphasis added). A covered "aGcount institution" is defined as "any person
which in the ordinary course of its business maintains accounts for its customers,"
id. § 53(1), and an "order" is broadly defined to include both electronic and
paper-based transfers, id. § 10 & comment 2 (discussing the purpose and existing
law).
16. See Report of the Director, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTION, 1985 ANNuAL
REPORT 15-16.
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CONTEMPORARY PAYMENTS LAW

Unlike the uniform law of sales, payments law has not developed systematically along lines established by reference to thoughtful jurisprudential principles. 17 A comparison of the legislative
foundations of Article 4 of the UCC and representative branches
of new payments systems law reveals that the competing legislative
initiatives do not properly accommodate the opposing interests of
financial institutions and their customers. During the formative
years of the check collection system in the United States, the
American Bankers Association advocated the development of common law and statutory principles that would insulate banks from
risk and reinforce the superior bargaining position of its constituency.18 Those efforts at risk avoidance are better viewed as
commercially shrewd than necessarily evil; the more transaction
risk banks could avoid and impose on their customers, the more
profitable the banking business could become. However, it is one
thing to absolve the bank lobby from moral blame for advocating
its self-interest, but quite another to abdicate to that interest group
nearly absolute legislative authority. The history of Article 4 of
the UCC suggests that bank interests may have been overrepresented
on the committee responsible for the final draft of the Deposits
and Collections provisions of the Code. An analysis of the language,
operation, and legislative history of section 4-407 illustrates the
predisposition of Article 4.

A.

The Payor Bank,s Right to Subrogation on Improper
Payment Under Section 4-407 of the UCC

Although a drawer retains the "absolute" right to stop payment
on a check any time prior to its payment, 19 section 4-407 of the

17. For a discussion of the genesis of the U.C.C., especially in regard to
Article 2 and its predecessors, see W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 270-301.
18. See Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REv. 737, 740-76 (1978).
"The commercial law of bank collections . . . reflects the desire of transactors
to alter the competitive effects of the existing allocation of risk. Commercial
legislation becomes the method by which particular interests achieve their substantive objectives, instead of a means by which society develops a rational
payments system." /d. at 792.
19. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1977) ("Customer's Right to Stop Payment;
Burden of Proof of Loss") & comment 2, which states: "The position taken by
this section is that stopping payment is a service which depositors expect and
are entitled to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience
and expense.''
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UCC20 effectively shifts the risk of a bank's wrongful payment of
an item in contravention of the stop payment order from the bank
to the customer. In an action by the drawer against its bank to
recover the amount wrongfully paid, section 4-407 allows the bank
to assert the defenses of the payee or any holder of the instrument. 21
If the check previously had come into the possession of a holder
in due course,22 the drawer would have virtually no recourse23
against the drawee bank. The depositary bank,24 or any intermediary
bank, 25 including the presenting bank,26 may qualify for holder in
due course status as long as it gives "value" 27 for the paper. Since
most checks are presented through banking channels rather than
"over the counter," and since depositary banks give value when
they permit a customer to draw against uncollected funds, 28 the
subrogation rights provided by section 4-407 are substantial. 29
The average check, according to a 1982 report, 30 is drawn for
$570. This amount may be significant to individual consumers,
20. /d. § 4-407 ("Payor Bank's Right to Subrogation on Improper Payment").
21. See id.
22. See id. § 3-302(1) (defining holder in due course status).
23. See id. § 4-407(a) (establishing the payor bank's right to be subrogated
to the rights "of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or
maker").
24. A "depositary bank" is defined as "the first bank to which an item
is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor bank." /d. § 4105(a).
25. An "intermediary bank" is defined as "any bank to which an item
is transferred in course of collection except the depositary or payor bank." /d.
§ 4-105(c).
26. A "presenting bank" is defined as "any bank presenting an item
except a payor bank." /d. § 4-105(e). "Presentment" is defined in Article 4, see
id. § 4-104(3), by reference to § 3-504, which formulates "presentment" as "a
demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee, or
other payor by or on behalf of the holder." /d. § 3-504(1).
27. See id. § 3-302(1)(a) (requiring that holder in due course take the
instrument for value). Banks may give "value" and achieve holder in due course
status under Article 4 by the operation of two sections. One section accords
banks a security interest in a check or its proceeds in certain circumstances. See
id. § 4-208{1). The other establishes that, for the purpose of holder in due course
status, "value" is given on an item in which the bank has a security interest to
the extent of that security interest. See id. § 4-209; infra notes 217-29 and
accompanying text.
28. See U.C.C. §§ 4-208(l)(c), 4-209.
29. See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d
920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
30. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., ISSUES AND NEEDS IN THE NATION'S
PAYMENT SYSTEM 12, table 1 (1982).
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but is not likely to justify economically the drawer's initiation and
prosecution of a lawsuit against the drawee that has paid over a
stop order. In many instances, the amount of a wrongfully paid
check might exceed the state's small claims court jurisdictional
limit and yet be insufficient to justify the litigation expense and
delays inherent in a standard tort or contract case. Certainly, were
the litigation postures reversed, it is unlikely that a payor bank
would initiate an action to recover its wrongful payment of the
average check. Early drafts of Article 4 did not authorize a drawee
to unilaterally debit the drawer's account for an item paid over a
valid stop order. 31 In late 1951 however, the portion of draft
section 4-507 that prohibited a bank from debiting a customer's
account after wrongfully paying an item was deleted.32 The section
4-407 subrogation rights thereafter were used defensively by drawee
banks.
A relic of the pre-1951 formulation appears in the section 4407 language providing that the drawee's rights under the provision
are only available "to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the
extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its
payment of the item. " 33 As the subrogation provision now operates,
the unjust enrichment language is not coextensive with the second
portion of the same clause preventing loss to the bank by reason
of its wrongful payment. 34 Section 4-407 permits the bank to recoup
its loss absolutely, not subject to the unjust enrichment limitation,
provided the bank can fortuitously identify a prior holder in due
course.35 However, when the drawer stops payment for cause and

31. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-507 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring 1951),
reprinted in 12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 188 (E. Kelly ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.: DRAFTs].
32. See U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -407 (Final Text Ed. 1951), reprinted in 12
U.C.C.: DRAFTS, supra note 31, at 536-57.
33. U.C.C. § 4-407. Similar language appeared in code drafts dating back
to at least 1950. See U.C.C. § 4-402 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950),
reprinted in 10 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 532-33.
34. See South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Donner, 104 N.J. Super. 169, 177,
249 A.2d 25, 30 (1969) ("While the remedy afforded by section 4-407 is in part
expressly directed to the prevention of 'unjust enrichment,' nowhere in the statute
is there any requirement that all of the defendants who may be joined in the
action be 'unjustly enriched.'").
35. This perversion of the unjust enrichment doctrine contradicts the
accepted understanding of the concept. The Restatement of Restitution explains
that the equitable right tor subrogation arises when the "property of one person
is used [to discharge] an obligation owed by another . . . under such circumstances
that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits thus
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the payor is permitted to assume the rights of a holder in due
course, unjust enrichment is inapposite. Subsection (c) of 4-407,
which subrogates the payor to rights of the drawer against the payee,
should sufficiently protect the payor in this setting. 36 The justification for the holder in due course concept, if it has any application
in contemporary payments law, 37 is absent from the section 4-407
subrogation contest. The original "law merchant" interest in ~ash
substitutes does not support a rule that sanctions drawee negligence.
The expediency of the payments system is not improved by commercial paper laws that insulate negligent practices from victims'
efforts to recoup their losses. Under the current formulation, the
drawer whose account has been charged over a valid stop payment
order must initiate legal action to recover the misapplied funds.
To prevail, the drawer must overcome the drawee's assertion of
holder in due course rights. Given the relative ease with which
depositary banks may claim holder in due course status under
Article 4,38 the drawer invariably will be unable to overcome that
assertion.
Notwithstanding the Code drafters' protestations that the UCC
was designed to describe and clarify rather than change the commercial practices existing at the time of its composition, 39 Article
4, particularly in section 4-407, readjusted rights existing prior to
its promulgation. Pre-UCC law provided that a bank that paid
over a valid stop payment order would be liable to the drawer for

conferred." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937). A drawer
who pays for goods by check and then stops payment without cause is not
injured when the payee receives payment even if that is only accomplished by
the bank's payment over the stop order. To avoid unjust enrichment in that
context, the payor need not assume the rights of a holder in due course because
§ 4-407 allows the payor to subrogate the rights of the payee. See V.C.C. § 4407(b).
36. See V.C.C. § 4-407(c).
37. For a cogent critique of the effects of holder in due course status in
the context of checks, see Rosenthal, Negotiability: Who Needs It? 71 CoLUM.
L. REv. 375, 381-94 (1971); see also Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea
and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15
GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) (questioning efficacy of general notion of the "good
faith purchaser" in modern commercial law).
38. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 4, at 377-78 ("The Code is not of
course a reform statute; it is not designed to bring the millenium . . • . It is an
honest effort to state basic rules of commercial law which reflect, more accurately
and flexibly than do the present rules, going methods of operation. ").
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the amount of the check.40 This provision could lead to harsh
results. A drawer might stop payment of a check for no legitimate
reason. Then, if the bank paid over the stop order, the drawer
could retain any consideration he received from the payee of the
check and require the drawee to recredit his account. The bank
would be liable for the amount of the check and the drawer would,
upon the recredit, be unjustly enriched to the extent that the
consideration he received from the payee was valuable. That strict
liability rule was inefficient and unjust. Subrogation theory developed to mitigate the harshness of that result. 41 A bank that
negligently paid over a stop order would be strictly liable to the
drawer subject to the bank's right to subrogation against a party
unjustly enriched, possibly the drawer.42 It was suggested that
application of subrogation principles would solve "the social welfare-maximizing equation.' ' 43

40. See F. BEUTEL, BRANNON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1316 (7th
ed. 1948) ("Since a check is not an assignment of the drawer's funds, the bank
is liable to him for paying it in disregard of a countermand.") (citing Hiroshima
v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); First Nat'l Bank of
Miami v. Davis, 150 Fla. 673, 8 So.2d 403 (1942); Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix
Nat'l Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y.S. 76 (1926); Wall v. Franklin Trust Co.,
84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1925); Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat'l Bank, 114 Tenn.
693, 88 S.W. 172 (1905); Huffman v. Farmers' Nat'l Bank, 10 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928)).
41. See Comment, Stop Payment: An Ailing Service to the Business
Community, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 667, 673-74 (1953) ("To reduce the sanction
for failure to [heed a stop-payment order] . •• several theories have been
advanced•..• The most favored theory is that of subrogation .. . . ").
42. In this way, subrogation elegantly satisfies the sanction criterion
... : the real burden that stop payment seeks to minimize-finding, and
getting and executing judgment against a party wrongfully paid-is clearly
placed upon the bank, but there is no penalty .. . insofar as the failure
causes no injury.
/d. at 674.
43. /d. Banking interests, however, were not comfortable with this social
welfare calculus. The bankers were in favor of eliminating the drawer's right to
stop payment, by relying upon freedom of contract principles. In passbooks and
stop order forms, the banks included clauses exculpating them from negligently
paying over a stop order. /d. at 675; see Note, Exculpation Contracts in
Stop-Payment Orders, 6 RuTGERS L. REv. 577, 579 (1952) ("[B]anks have resorted
to release clauses to protect themselves against responsibility for failure to obey
stop-payment orders."); see also Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity,
1952 Wis. L. REv. 265, 266 ("[T]he practice had developed for banks to state
. . . on deposit tickets, bank statements, collection letters and acknowledgments
of receipt of items the terms under which they would undertake collection of

1986]

BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONS

1289

The subrogation theory appeared in the 1934 draft of a Uniform
Bank Collection Act prepared by the N.C.C.U.S.L. but was never
promulgated.44 The theory reappeared in the 1949 draft of Article
3 in Comment 8 to section 3-415, and precluded banks from
contractually avoiding their stop payment obligation. 45 Comment
8, however, gave effect to the subrogation theory stating:
The drawee is . . . entitled to subrogation to prevent unjust
enrichment. It has sometimes been said that payment cannot
be stopped against a holder in due course, but the statement
is inaccurate. The payment can be stopped, but the drawee,
if he pays, becomes subrogated to the rights of a holder
in due course against the drawer. 46
items.").
Such clauses were found to be valid in some states. See Comment, supra
note 41, at 675 (citing Hodrick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183
N.E. 488 (1932); Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782
(1920); Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929)). Most states,
however, found that such clauses violated either public policy or the consideration
rules of contract doctrine and thus invalidated them on one or the other of these
grounds. See Comment, supra note 41, at 675 (citing Hiroshima v. Bank of
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926) (public policy); Grisinger v. Golden
State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 P. 425 (1928) (public policy); Calimita v.
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949) (consideration);
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'I Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84
A.2d 741 (1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (consideration; Speroff
v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948) (public
policy); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 126 L.I. 203 (Pa. 1952) (public policy);
Note, supra at 589-90.
44. Section 14 of a proposed draft of this Act read as follows:
A bank of payment which prematurely pays a post-dated item drawn
on or made or accepted payable at such bank, or which pays an item
contrary to a duly received stop order, may, at its election, treat the
item as unpaid and have such rights upon the item against the drawer
or person making or accepting the item so payable as the holder thereof
to whom it paid would have in such case, or treat it as paid and have
such rights growing out of the transaction giving rise to the item as the
drawer or person making the item so payable would have against the
person to whom it was issued.
Unif. Bank Collection Act § 14 (5th Tent. Draft 1934), reprinted in HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

172-

73 (1934) (emphasis in original), and noted in Comment, supra note 41, at 674
n.33.
45. Subsection 3-415(4) of the 1949 draft read as follows: "Although the
drawee cannot by contract avoid its obligations under this section, it may make
a reasonable charge for stopping payment." U.C.C. §3-415 (Draft, May 1949),
reprinted in 7 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 384.
46. U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 8 (Draft, May 1949), reprinted in 7 U.C.C.:
DRAFTS, supra note 31, at 386.
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Notwithstanding the questionable logic of providing the drawee
subrogation to holder in due course rights,47 the section clearly
and correctly placed the initial loss on the negligent drawee. A
bank could not debit the drawer's account but was required to
incur the expense and uncertainty of a legal proceeding to obtain
reimbursement for loss attributable to its own negligence. 48
At hearings on the UCC held in January 1951, Article 4 was
severely criticized by representatives of financial institution interests. In May 1951, Article 4 was deleted from the Code.49 By
September of the same year, a draft reworked by bankers and
their counsel was quickly approved by the ALI and N.C.C.U.S.L. 50
The Bank Deposits and Collections Article remains today essentially
as adjusted by the bank lobby. 51 The final November 1951 draft
altered the litigation posture of banks and their customers in the
context of a wrongful payment over a stop order. Banks were
now permitted to charge their customer's account and then to
interpose defensively the rights of an available holder in due course
in the customer's action against the bank. In sum, the bank lobby

47. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
48. See U.C.C. § 4-507 {Revisions of Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950),
reprinted in 11 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 383-84. This section read as
follows:
To prevent unjust enrichment, a bank which has paid a customer's
item which it may not charge in full to his account may in an action:
(a) against a prior holder who has received the payment, recover
any part thereof due its customer or any prior party in respect of the
transaction in which the customer of the depositary bank acquired the
item; and
(b) against the drawer, maker or acceptor recover any amount
which would have been due from him on the item if payment had been
refused.
The bank has no right to charge the customer's account in respect of
such cause of action. The bank may bring either or both such actions
but may have only one satisfaction and any right to consequential or
punitive damages remains with the customer or holder.
Id. The provision denying the drawee bank the right to debit its customer's
account last appeared in the September 3, 1951 Text Edition of Article 4 as §
4-407. It was deleted in the Final Text Edition, dated November 1951. Compare
12 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31 at 188, with id. at 557.
49. Beutel, supra note 4, at 359.
50. Professor Beutel observed that the new draft was mailed to the members
of the ALI and N.C.C.U.S.L. less than three weeks before the vote on the
revisions. /d. & n.141.
51. Compare U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -504, with U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -407
(Final Text Ed. 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 53657.
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changed the pre-Code law to enhance the interests of financial
institutions.
Malcolm's discussion of the stop payment problem reveals the
obfuscation accomplished by banking interests. In a 1952 law
review article he explained that ''with the tremendous volume of
items handled, it is impossible for banks to successfully receive,
process and give effect to, each stop payment order that is received. " 52 He then described the banks' use of exculpatory clauses
in stop order forms and cited a report of the Committee on Bank
Operations of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association.53
[The Report] concluded that by the weight of authority
such clauses are supported by adequate consideration and
held not to be against public policy. The argument is further
advanced that by drawing and issuing a check the depositor
has set in motion a course of events looking toward the
negotiation and payment of the check, and if he elects to
change his mind he should assume the risk of not being
able to reverse the process he has started in the absence
of bad faith on the part of the bank. 54
There are two significant problems with Malcolm's analysis. First,
he misrepresented the law; and second, the proximate causation
and assumption of risk arguments contradict established liability
theories and commercial paper policies. The ABA report cited by
Malcolm reviewed the case law in only five states55 and the San
Juan District of Puerto Rico. Although the report concluded that
such clauses were upheld in Indiana, Massachusetts, and New
York, it refused to express an opinion as to whether an exculpatory
clause obviated "the criticism that there is no consideration for
such agreement on the part of the depositor, or as to whether
such a contract stands on a different or better footing with respect
to public policy. " 56 A law review note published the same year as

52. Malcolm, supra note 43, at 296.
53. Committee on Bank Operations, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law, Validity of Exculpatory Clauses in Stop Payment Notices, 5
Bus. LAW. 101 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Exculpatory Clauses].
54. Malcolm, supra note 43, at 297 (emphasis added) (footnote deleted).
55. The five states covered in the report were: Indiana, Massachusetts,
New York, California, and Ohio. See Exculpatory Clauses, supra note 53, at
101. California and Ohio were cited as invalidating such clauses in deposit
contracts as void against public policy. See id.
56. /d. at 107.
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the Malcolm Article concluded that while exculpatory clauses might
insulate banks from the consequences of inadvertence or accident,
"[t]his is a release from absolute liability, but not from negligence.
For negligent acts the bank will still be liable, whatever the wording
of the release clause. " 57 Cases support this construction of preCode law. ss While the essential distinction between "inadvertence
or accident" and negligence may be difficult to formulate, or even
imagine, the cases do not support the position that banks should
be insulated from liability only when they have not acted in bad
faith.
Malcolm's causation and assumption of risk arguments are
perhaps most troubling because they display the drafters' predisposition toward the bank-customer relationship and thus explain
the profinancial institution bias of Article 4. His assertion that
the customer is in some way responsible for the wrongful payment
because the customer is the cause in fact of the check's entering
the collection process, imposes an unreasonabler burden on depositors. In effect, customers would become insurers of their banks'
item clearance procedures. 59 It is inconceivable that such a position
would be tenable in a Code that in very certain terms recognizes
the efficacy of a stop payment right:
The position taken by ... section [4-403] is that stopping
payment is a service which depositors expect and are entitled
to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable occasional losses
through failure to stop should be borne by the banks as a
cost of the business of banking.60
How could the section 4-403 stop payment right and the accompanying Comment coexist with the sweeping provision of subrogation rights in section 4-407? The answer is that the inclusion of
section 4-403 in Article 4 is similar to the reference to "unjust
enrichment" in section 4-407. It can only be explained as a remnant

57. Note, supra note 43, at 590.
58. See Comment, supra note 43 & the authorities cited therein.
59. Moreover, Malcolm's argument proves too much. Given his predisposition, perhaps a drawer should be liable for the amount of an item that the
drawee pays over a forged payee's endorsement, see V.C.C. § 4-401, because the
drawer is responsible for the check entering the collection process.
60. /d. § 4-403 comment 2.
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of the pre bank lobby version of Article 4, 61 as developed by a
drafting committee less concerned with assuring the bank lobby
virtually every conceivable benefit available through commercial
paper legislation, 62 and more concerned with striking a balance
between the interests of banks and their customers.

B. New Payment Systems Law and the Provision of Individual
Consumer Rights
The argument that efficient processing of payments requires
financial institutions to be afforded every deference in legislation
or the financial world will come to an end is no longer convincing,
and probably never was accurate. But such thinking supported the
drafting of Article 4. Recent experience suggests that Armageddon
is not a certain consequence of legislating that banks be solicitous
of their customers' interests. Although consumer protection measures
are not without their own costs,63 proponents of such legislation
argue that the benefits in justice and fairness offset those costs.64
The Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act (E.F.T.A.),65 drafted
along the lines suggested by the federal law governing credit card
transactions, 66 acknowledges that its "primary objective ... is the
provision of individual consumer rights. " 67 The scope of the Act
includes preauthorized debits and credits68 and recurring telephone
61. See, e.g., id. § 4-507 (Revisions of Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950),
reprinted in 1I U.C.C.: DR.AF:rs, supra note 31, at 383-84 (expressly denying
bank's "right" to charge the customer'sr account for payment over a valid stop
order).
62. For a brief discussion of the drafters' attempt to satisfy the New York
banking interests, see Rapson, Book Review, 41 Bus. LAW. 675, 676 n.4, 677
(1986) (reviewing F. Mn.LER & A. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MoDERN PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND NoTEs (1985)) (quoting a letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J.
Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980) stating: "Malcolm, who was a man of the highest personal
integrity, understood that it was his function to do whatever was necessary to
placate the New York group (who, nevertheless, refused to be placated)." (footnote
omitted)).
63. The disclosure and compliance burdens imposed on financial institutions are significant. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, 1 11-02, at
11-7 to -25.
64. See Budnitz, The Finicky Computer, the Paperless Telex and the
Fallible Swiss: Bank Technology and the Law, 25 B.C.L. REv. 259 (1984)
(describing the "humanizers" approach to payments legislation and the role of
technology); see also infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982).
66. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
67. 15 u.s.c. § 1693(b).
68. SeeN. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, 11 4.05[5][b), 5.01[1])[2];
15 U.S.C. § 1693e.
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transactions, 69 as well as automated teller machine and point-ofsale systems.70 The Act also establishes the liability of financial
institutions for failing "to stop payment of a preauthorized transfer
from a consumer's account when instructed to do so." 71 The
accompanying regulation explains that "[a] consumer may stop
payment of a preauthorized electronic fund transfer from the
consumer's account by notifying the financial institution orally or
in writing at any time up to 3 business days before the scheduled
date of the transfer. " 72 If the financial institution "unintentionally"
fails to stop payment when properly instructed to do so, the
E.F.T.A. provides that "the financial institution shall be liable
for actual damages proved. " 73 Section 908 of the Act clarifies that
the failure to honor a proper stop payment request is "an error"74
and requires the financial institution to "correct the error ...
including the crediting of interest where applicable.' ' 75
The E.F. T .A., then, imposes the initial loss and perhaps the
burden of initiating litigation76 on the financial institution that
failed to honor the stop payment order. The Act includes no
subrogation provision as does UCC section 4-407. 77 In addition,
the E.F.T .A. exposes the financial institution to all "actual damages" proved, a phrase that has been construed under the UCC78
to extend to emotional distress and other consequential damages. 79

69. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, ~ 5.05(3][f), n.233.
Nonrecurring telephone transactions are excepted by 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6)(E).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (describing scope of E.F.T.A.).
71. Id. § 1693h(a)(3).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1985).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(c).
74. An "error" is defined by the Act as " an unauthorized electronic fund
transfer." Id. § 1693f(f)(l). A payment over a stop order is "unauthorized" and
thus fits within the statutory definition of an "error."
75. Id. § 1693f(b).
76. See id. § 1693f(c) (requiring, in most circumstances, provisional recredit
to the customer's account for amount of alleged error). Assuming the customer
has received the recredit, the customer need only withdraw funds from the
disputed account to force the bank into court for the recovery of its alleged
loss.
77. A consumer may thus avoid a payment and wrongfully retain the
consideration received; the financial institution that has paid over the stop payment
order is not subrogated to the rights of the payee. Similarly, if the consumer
has a defense good against the recipient of the payment, the Act does not
subrogate the financial institution to the rights of the consumer-customer.
78. See V .C.C. § 4-402 (1977) ("Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful
Dishonor").
79. See, e.g., Twin City Bank v. Issacs, 283 Ark. 127, 672 S.W.2d 651
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To permit subrogation in the check collection process and not
provide for it in the context of electronic funds transfers is
unreasonable. Subrogation to the rights of the drawer or payee
should be expressly provided in both bodies of law. Subrogation
to the rights of a holder in due course should not be available.
Both the check law and electronic funds transfer law should
preclude a financial institution's debiting a consumer account to
realize the benefits of that subrogation right. 80
The drafters of the Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.),
in the last draft publicly circulated, approached this formulation
but did not impose on financial institutions the expense of initiating
litigation to determine the viability of subrogation rights. 81 Unless
that burden is unequivocally imposed on the financial institutions,
they may use the subrogation theory to a much greater extent than
contemplated by principles of unjust enrichment. Also, the U .N.P. C.
would have left "[t]he burden of establishing the fact and amount

(1984) (damages for mental suffering available under § 4-402 even when bank's
wrongful dishonor not tantamount to level of culpability for intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App.
3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975) ("tortious" damages for emotional distress
recoverable under § 4-402 and not precluded because "wrongful dishonor" may
also embrace a contract claim); Bank v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968) (§ 4402 codifies common law, which allowed recovery of both direct and consequential
damages); Northern Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(mental distress may be considered in awarding consequential damages under §
4-402).
80. The provision precluding a bank's debit of its customer's account in
the September 3, 1951 draft of the U.C.C. has been previous discussed. See
supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text. For the text of this provision, see
supra note 48.
81. See U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 432, at 327. That section reads as
follows:
If a payor account institution has paid an order of the drawer
which has been stopped or reversed, or otherwise under circumstances
giving a basis for objection by the drawer, to prevent unjust enrichment
and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the account institution
by reason of its payment of the order, the account institution shall be
subrogated to the rights
(a) the payee or other party to which payment was made, on the
order or under the transaction out of which the order arose against the
drawer;
(b) the drawer, on the order or under the transaction out of which
the order arose against the payee or party to which payment was made;
and
(c) any funds claimant with due-course rights on the order against
the drawer.
/d.

1296

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:1279

of loss resulting from the payment of an order contrary to a
binding stop order" on the customer. 82 The combination of this
formulation from Article 4 of the UCC83 and the requirement of
a provisional recredit pending resolution of the error from the
E.F.T.A. is incongruous. 84

82. U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 425, at 288.
83. See V.C.C. § 4-403(1).
84. The U.N.P.C. contains a recredit provision similar to that contained
in the E.F.T.A. See U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 302(2)(a). This section provides
as follows:
(2) The account institution shall investigate a!ld determine within
sixty (60) days after receiving a notice of an error whether the alleged
error occurred, and shall transmit the results of its investigation and
determination to the customer, provided that if the account institution
does not complete the investigation to the extent of its own records and
transmit the results of such investigation to the customer pursuant to
subsection (1) within ten (10) business days, the account institution:
(a) shall make a provisional adjustment to the customer's account
for the amount of the alleged error, or the maximum amount of recredit
due to the customer if the alleged error is determined to be an error in
fact, or $500, whichever is less, during the investigation (including interest
where applicable), or, where the alleged error concerns an extension of
credit, shall refrain during the investigation from taking any action to
collect the amount disputed (including finance charges, late payment
charges, or other charges computed on such amount) and not apply
against the credit limit the amount indicated to be in error of $500,
whichever is less ....
!d. at 212-13. This section is similar to the E.F.T.A. recredit provision. Compare
id., with 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(c) (discussed supra note 76). Unlike the E.F.T.A.,
however, which clearly gives consumers a genuine recredit " right," the U.N.P.C.'s
incorporation of language similar to that contained in U.C.C. § 4-403(3) in
U.N.P .C. § 425 dilutes significantly the proconsumer orientation of the U.N.P .C.'s
recredit provision. U.N.P.C. § 425, like U.C.C. § 4-403(3), imposes the burden
of proof on the customer, not on the bank. Professor Clark has described the
§ 4-403(3) "fact and amount of loss" burden on bank customers as "a wonder
of bank lobbying." B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND
CREDIT CARDs, <I 2.6[2], at 2-48 (rev. ed. 1981). The principal problem with
the provision is its uncertain and potentially harsh operation in connection with
§ 4-407 subrogation rights. It is unclear what the customer must prove-whether
the customer must show that a sufficiently precise stop order was issued, or must
also establish that the payor's § 4-407 subrogation right would be unavailable
against the customer on the facts of the particular case. The September 1950
Draft of § 4-503, the predecessor to current § 4-403, described the "Customer's
Right to Stop Payment" in substantially the same terms as the present formulation
but without subsection (3). Compare U.C.C. § 4-507 (Revisions of Articles 2, 4
& 9, Sept. 1950), reprinted in U.C.C.: DR.AFTs, supra note 31, at 383-84, with
U.C.C. § 4-403. The burden to prove fact and amount of loss was not expressly
imposed on the customer until the September 1951 Draft, the one profoundly
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The U.N.P .C. drafters assembled a rule from diametrically
opposed component parts (UCC and E.F.T.A.) and concluded with
a patchwork that does not properly address the problem. They
would have improved the law governing electronic fund transfers
by providing a subrogation provision, but undermined that improvement by juxtaposing with it the requirement that the customer
bear the burden of proving the fact and amount of loss. If future
efforts to codify payments law are to succeed, the drafters must
first develop a mature jurisprudential frame of reference. Only
then can payments law achieve the necessary accommodation of
the conflicting interests involved. A viable foundation for such a
pursuit may be found in the principles of legal realism as expounded
by Karl Llewellyn.
influenced by the banking lobby. A 1954 commentary recognized that "it may
be argued that under the Code the drawer makes out a prima facie case when
he shows (1) a valid stop-payment order and (2) that a charge has been made
to his account." Morrison & Sneed, Bank Collections: The Stop-Payment Transaction-A Comparative Study, 32 TEx. L. REv. 259, 316 (1954). However, the
commentators find more convincing the illustration offered at the September
1951 N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting on the U.C.C.:
[S]ometimes a check "is stopped when there has been no failure of
consideration, and the burden should be on the drawer of the check to
show how much he has been damaged, which, in other words, means
that if he gave a check for $1000 for some goods which were not as
warranted, and they were only worth $500 but the bank wrongly paid
the check anyway, he must show that the goods were worth only $500
... due to the wrongful payment of the check .... "
/d. at 316-17 (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole, Uniform Commercial Code,
Sept. 10-15, 1951, at 56-57 (remarks of Mr. Birbaum)) (on file at The Wayne
Law Review).
A federal district court in Massachusetts has read § 4-403(3) and § 4407 to
impose the onerous burden on a customer "to avoid circuity of action." Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790, 794 (D.
Mass. 1958). District Judge Wyzanski concluded "that [the customer] is not
allowed to recover because it has not borne its burden of showing that it suffered
loss ... ;[drawer] suffered no loss because it would have been liable to [intermediary bank] as a holder in due course in any event." !d. at 794-95. Not all
of the cases have embraced the perspective of the N.C.C.U.S.L. illustration,
however. The New York court in Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank,
86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976), gave effect to the policy
underlying § 4403 by granting judgment to the plaintiff-customer and imposing
on the payor bank the burden of producing evidence that would show that the
customer did not suffer loss. The facts reveal that the Thomas decision was
particularly indulgent of the customer's rights; the plaintiff's stop order misidentified the check number. The court considered the error de minimis, though
perhaps it was not, from the perspective of the bank's computer. The § 4403
formulation of the burden of proof is at least awkward and probably unjust.
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Commentators have considered the jurispurdence of the Code
from the viewpoint of legal philosophy85 -jurisprudence "for
the hundred. " 86 Several articles have suggested perspectives for
practice under the Code, describing methods of construing particular provisions. 87 Not since Llewellyn's death, however, has the
efficacy of drafting commercial law from the legal realists' frame
of reference been examined. A discussion of realism and its relationship to commercial law is a prerequisite to appraising the
value of applying realistic principles to payments law. The necessity
and consequences of delegating responsibility for the several Articles
of the UCC undermined Llewellyn's efforts to impress his understanding of legal realism on the entire Code.88 Nevertheless, Article
2 demonstrates, to a considerable extent, the application of his
views to the sale89 of goods.90 The realistic principles embodied in

85. See, e.g., Carroll, Harpooning Whales, Of Which Karl N. Llewellyn
Is The Hero Of The Piece; Or Searching For More Expansion Joints in Karl's
Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 139 (1970); Danzig, A
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the U.C.C., 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975);
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 155 U. PA.
L.R. 485 (1967).
86. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Lewellyn's division of legal studies into three distinct levels, including "jurisprudence for the hundred."
87. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL.
L.F. 291.
88. See Carroll, supra note 85, at 151. Carroll explains that "it is impossible
to assess accurately the degree to which Llewellyn lost control of the code or
the extent to which his purposes were frustrated," especially since Llewellyn "did
not write in detail on this subject." Id. Carroll then provides a quotation of
Llewellyn's that reflects the drafters' disappointment in certain sections of the
Code: "I am ashamed of it in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas that I tried to get in that
would have been good for the law, but I was voted down." ld. at 152 (citing
Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code? 22 TENN. R. REv. 779, 784 (1953)).
89. Article 2 is titled "Sales" and, by its terms, would seem to apply only
to sales transactions, not leases or bailments. However, the scope provision,
U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977), refers to "transactions in goods," and has been a ready
source for the argument that Article 2 should be given broad application. See,
e.g., Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House,
59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969) (applying warranty provisions of
Article 2 to a lease transaction by analogy), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970); see also Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010 (1968).
90. Courts are not consistent in determining when a transaction is a sale
of goods or services. Compare Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108,
364 A.2d 1221 (1975) (installation of swimming pool is a service outside scope
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Article 2 facilitate the use of tort analysis and endeavor to reflect
and accommodate the unique nature of the commercial community.
Nothing is peculiar to the law of sales that would compromise its
service as a model for payments law.91 As the commercial bar and
academicians turn their attention to the codification of payments
law, the approach utilized in the Sales Article must be considered.
Succinctly, what has worked for sales may also work for payments.
This portion of the Article formulates an essential principle of
Llewellyn's legal realism, situation sense,92 and considers how the

of Article 2), with Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1977) (installation of
swimming pool within scope of Article 2; warranty sections of sales provisions
applicable). See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 85 (1981). It has been observed that courts
are not blind to the effects of applying Article 2 to the facts of a particular
case. "Considerable judicial hostility has long existed as to the [§ 2-201] Statute
of Frauds. A general disposition against its application to prevent proof of a
contract is served by determining that a given set of facts is not within the scope
of Article 2." Deusenbert, Strategies in Preparing, Interpreting and Managing
Sales Contracts 6, 7, appearing in 19TH ANNUAL UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INSTITUTE (course materials) (March 6-8, 1986) (citing Computer Servicenter, Inc.
v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (N.D.S.C. 1970) aff'd mem., 443 F.2d
906 (4th Cir. 1971); Buttorf v. United Elec. Labs., Inc., 459 S.W.2d 581 (Ky.
App. 1970); National Historic Shrines Found. v. Dali, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
(CALLAGHAN) 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)) (on file at The Wayne L. Review).
91. The argument could be made that Article 2 is fundamentally distinguishable from Article 4 insofar as the relative bargaining positions of typical
transactors is concerned. A buyer in a sales transaction may, and indeed usually
will, be a seller in the next transaction. J .C. Penney buys from sellers and sells
to buyers. Therefore, large merchant interests would support legislation that fairly
accommodates the interests of both buyers and sellers.
Payments law, however, is concerned with striking a balance between banks
and their customers. Few customers act as banks, just as few banks act as
consumers of bank services in the same way individuals and smaller businesses
"consume" retail banking services. When the banks are considering payments
legislation, then, it would not be difficult to support rules that protect bank
interests at the expense of consumer interests. Such a posture would be efficacious
until a coherent and effective consumer lobby formed. That dichotomy would
explain why Articles 2 and 4 differ in their balancing of conflicting interests,
but does not justify the inequitable balance that this Article argues resulted from
the lobbying dynamics in the early 1950s. Article 2 provides an appJoach to
balancing competing commercial interestsr that does not unduly favor one constituency over another and, therefore, should inform the drafting of new payments
law.
92. Twining notes that Llewellyn's use of the term "situation sense" is
obscure and suggests further that Llewellyn failed to use the term consistently:
"[l]s [Llewellyn] referring to a faculty or to actual perception or the signification
or meaning of a situation or to something else?" After a brief analysis, Twining
concludes that "sense cannot mean faculty, but it could mean either 'the meaning
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homogeneity of commercial interests may make possible the coherent application of tort principles to payment issues.
Because the UCC is a code, it makes demands on attorneys
not fully appreciated by those who perceive its provisions as a
system of discrete answers to typical controversies. 93 Rarely is a
commercial court constrained to reach a particular result under
the most Llewellynesque provisions of Article 2. Instead, the
sections invite a reexamination of the equities attending the particular facts in issue. "Article II . . . operated as a means of
dictating a method. That method was designed to prompt decision
not according to the letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic
concept but rather according to the 'situation-reason. "'94 Though
Llewellyn's elaboration of situation reason, or situation sense, has
not provided a model of clarity, his persistent emphasis on the

of the situation' or what would be sensible (i.e., judicious) in this situation. "
Twining argues that lying within this definition of "situation sense" is
evidence that Llewellyn "was lured by his flirtation with natural law into deviation
from his normal stance as an empiricist and ethical relativist," because " meaning
of the situation" gives rise to a metaphysical inquiry about "finding .. . immanent
law . . . not known by empirical methods." Perhaps, though, Twining placed
too much emphasis on the word "sense" and not enough on "situation." Indeed,
he begins his discussion by defining the parameters of "sense" and then filtering
the "situation" through that delimitation. The result is that Twining further
obscures Llewellyn's phrase and turns the inquiry in a direction opposite of what
Llewellyn intended. See W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 219-21.
"Realism was never a philosophy [although] [i]t is persistently treated as
such. But realism is a method which can serve any goal at all." Herein lies the
importance of the word "situation." To deemphasize its meaning in favor of
"sense" is to commit Twining's analytical mistake. Llewellyn, recognizing that
realism and its corresponding terminology might be misinterpreted in just this
way, cautioned that: "[the] main trouble with treating the descriptive or technological branch of a discipline as a philosophy is that any preliminary or partial
work is likely to be viewed as if it were trying to be a whole, with negative
implications read in, indeed read in even though they be denied." See K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 509-10, n.2 (1960).
Llewellyn's "situation sense" found its way into the comments to U.C.C. § 2612 ("'Installment Contract' ; Breach"):
Even where a clause speaks of "a separate contract for all purposes,"
a commercial reading of the language under the section on good faith
and commercial standards requires that the singleness of the document
and the negotiation, together with the sense of the situation, prevail
over any uncommercial and legalistic interpretation.
U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 3 (emphasis added).
93. See Scott, supra note 18, at 738 ("Commercial law has become largely
the province of the adept reader of statutes, and the methodology of the Code is
the skill of working out language puzzles.").
94. See Danzig, supra note 85, at 632.
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immanent law of a fact pattern suggests that he considered situation
sense to be a venerable juristic concepL For the commercial
transactor and his counsel, nice questions of immanent justice do
little to establish the contours of a deal or to reveal the best
litigation posture when the deal falls apart. In The Common Law
Tradition, 95 Llewellyn. argued that situation sense has meaning on
that pragmatic level. He used Justice Benjamin Cardozo'B
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 96 opinion to describe his concept
of situation sense. 97 Llewellyn concluded that Cardozo's method
reflected the "Grand Style" of adjudication. What can be distilled
from Llewellyn's MacPherson section of The Common Law Tradition formulates what Llewellyn endeavored to draft into Article
2 of the Code. 98
Cardozo impressed Llewellyn by separating the principle or
reason for a rule from the precedential authority: "That principle
is then reformulated to fit the modern need, to solve the case in
hand, and to guide the future, its reason being made as explicit
as itself." 99 Precedent is thereby "cleaned up." 100 If the statute
or code is the only source of the law, the creative judge need not

95. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92.
96. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
97. To understand Llewellyn's demonstration of situation sense in
MacPherson, it is important first to understand that Cardozo was developing the
common law, not construing a code.
98. Llewellyn was impressed with Cardozo's MacPherson opinion:
Equally important, MacPherson v. Buick shows the "style of reason" at its best, in full recrudescence, indeed in full recapture, both in
the deciding and in the opinion-writing, and more than two generations
ago. It displays, in addition, an identifiable manner and technique of
opinion-writing peculiarly adapted to the present-day task of getting
back to the reasoned creative method of the early nineteenth century,
while both capitalizing on and reckoning with the insight and authority
embodied in the intervening cases-while also disposing of such of them
as may prove too remote from life because either the Formal Style or
some other aberration has in the interim lost contact with life-needs or
even made conscious rapprochement therewith seem immaterial.
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 431. Cardozo was a uniquely talented jurist,
able to impose his creative abilities on the facts of a controversy to discover
"the individual equities." /d. at 430. A Cardozo would not need a particular
form of commercial statute to reach commercially sound decisions. His rhetorical
prowess could manipulate the ostensibly formalistic statutory prescriptions and
proscriptions as nimbly as he could impose his creative constructions on common
law precedent. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 62-63 (1974) (noting
Cardozo's delight "in weaving gossamer spider webs of consideration").
99. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 431.
100. Id.
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expend efforts "cleaning up" precedent, and the less skilled jurist
will not be distracted by the need to distinguish troublesome
precedent. The UCC, because it is a code, is consistent with what
Llewellyn admired in MacPherson. In his important article concerning UCC methodology, Chancellor Hawkland recognized that
courts construing provisions of the Code should focus more on
the language of the Act's provisions than on other courts' construction of those provisions. 101
Llewellyn praised Cardozo's ability to manipulate the scope of
the liability principle to suit the facts of the case. Cardozo observed:
"Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not
fit the conditions of travel to-day," 102 and Llewellyn remarked:
"A question seen thus widens out; and, as is familiar, the resulting
rule or principle must therefore also widen out, to fit the now
perceived sense and need which only such a viewing of the question
could have opened." 103 Good commercial law, for Llewellyn, would
be drafted ''to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." 104

101. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292 {citing and quoting Gilmore, Legal
Realsim: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 {1961) ("A 'Code' . . .
remains at all times its own best evidence of what it means: cases decided under
it may be interesting, persuasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred for
decision to the undefiled code text.").
102. 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
103. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 432.
104. U.C.C. § 1-102 states:
(1) This Act shall be literally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement,
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act
may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement
determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations
is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words
"unless otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply
that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement
under subsection (3).
(5) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the
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Central concepts would be fluid, not static, and principle would
"be recurred to constantly, so as to correct and readjust precedent."105 Justice Cardozo's method is the type of analysis vindicated
by Llewellyn's legal realism. The dynamic nature of commercial
transactions mandates such a method just as it seems most acutely
to defy static formulation and application: "To speak of an
exclusively correct interpretation, one which would be the true
meaning of the statute from the beginning to the end of its day,
is altogether erroneous. '' 106
Insofar as legal realism provides a means to discover and
effectuate the goals and policies common among commercial transactors, it facilitates code treatment of commercial transactions. A
code is a "pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment
of a whole field of law." 107 Before an area of law may be codified
successfully, it must be delimited along functional lines: to be
"comprehensive" an enactment must describe the rights and liabilities in a discrete ''operational-body-of-law.'' 108 This requirement
dictates that the set of laws "be sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in accordance with its own
basic policies." 109
The attraction between commercial law and codification is a
function of the insular (but not provincial in the pejorative sense)
nature of commercial transactions. Llewellyn was impatient with
comprehensive theories of human behavior that obscured the forest
for the trees: "The effects of official action must then be different
for different persons or groups, according to the interests, habits,
complexes, occupations. " 110 To ignore distinctions that matter is

plural include the singular;
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may
refer to any gender.
105. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 436.
106. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 84-85 (1921)
(quoting Kohler, Interpretation ofLaw, translated in 9 MoDERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
192 (1969)).
107. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292.
108. See id. at 310.
109. !d. (emphasis added).
110. See K. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A

SERIES

Realist's Critique, reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77 (1962). "We live in a specialized, a differentiated society.
We live in groups, in constellations, unlike, far from, hardly aware of most of
those others who are the rest of us." !d. at 81.
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to engage in "lump-concept thinking," 111 anathema to a Llewellyn
realist. The business community's preoccupation with certainty,
predictability, and stability, tempered but not undermined by a
vigorous need and desire for flexibility in the application of law
to facts, resulted in the development of a ''bar beginning then to
specialize in clients (industrial clients who needed steadiness of
law)." 112 Once such a group of lawyers and clients took form, a
code could serve the group's idiosyncratic needs and aptitudes:
In the commercial field "reasonable reckonability" of outcome was most soundly based on the premise that in the
market commercial necessity generates to a large extent its
own uniformities of values and patterns of behavior; commercial self interest spurs most businessmen to act within
widely recognized leeways of decency and honesty: gross
abuses tend to be self-defeating and can be checked in any
case by making "honesty", "good faith", and "reasonableness" the principal baselines for adjudication. 113
Commercial transactors often need less guidance to structure a
transaction or even to pick up the pieces afterward than do similarly
situated laymen. Even the Code's detractors have recognized the
distinct characteristics of the commercial community: '' [Commercial law] is at the margin of public law. It deals with a subcommunity ... whose members occupy a status position distinct from
society at large [and] whose disputes are often resolved by informal

111. See W. TwiNING, supra note 8, at 136. Twining writes:
[T]here is a recurring theme of the need to be distrustful of broad
generalizations and especially of "lump concepts." This theme reaches
a crescendo in the analysis of "title." By "lump concepts" Llewellyn
meant abstract legal conceptions, such as "right''. "possession", "consideration", "title to goods", and "servant." . .. A general concept
which "lumped together" socially disparate situations ... or which was
used in different contexts to perform different functions ... was to be
viewed with skepticism.
/d. at 136-37. See also U.C.C. § 2-401 (describing the limited application of
"title" concepts in Article 2). See generally K. Llewellyn, supra note 110, at
95-97 (discussing "the role of concepts").
112. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI.
L. REV. 224, 240 (1942).
113. W. TwiNING, supra note 8, at 336. "Implicit in this view is a belief
that legal rules have a more marginal role to play in generating business expectations than some critics of the Code allow and that tight drafting will often be
at least as likely to defeat commercial expectations as provide a basis for them."
/d.
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negotiation or in private forums." 114 It is not necessary that all
groups concerned with the commercial law share the same level
of sophistication, so long as substantial differences in levels of
sophistication are made part of the calculus used to determine the
transactors' relative standards of care. 115
The merchant provisions in Article 2 evidence that all affected
transactors need not have identical, or even nearly identical, interests and levels of sophistication for comprehensive codification
of an entire field of law to work. 116 It is enough that the parties
have a sufficient identity of interests in particular recurring transactions to agree upon certain fundamental "uniformities of values
and patterns of behavior.'' 117 Commercial law drafted from the
perspective of only one of the affected interest groups may obscure
the object of commercial codification. The resulting legislation will
not achieve an equilibrium; it will sacrifice the balance that a true
accommodation of the opposing interests can accomplish. The
tension produced by the opposition of competing interests may
serve the needs of commerce by spawning flexible yet certain
legislation that is responsive to the interests of the transactors and
the exigencies of varied circumstances. 118 Llewellyn's legal realism

114. Danzig, supra note 85, at 622.
115. U.C.C. § 2-104(1), the "merchant" definition, illustrates well how a
commercial statute can consider varying levels of transactor sophistication without
compromising the demands for certainty and stability in commercial law. The
comment to the provision explains that the merchant concept is fluid:
The professional status under the definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business
practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of
specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish the merchant status
is indicated by the nature of the provisions.
U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2 (emphasis added). U.C.C. §§ 2-103, 2-104, 2-201, 2205, 2-207, 2-209, 2-312, 2-314, 2-327, 2-403, 2-509, 2-603, 2-605, and 2-609
refer to "merchants." Opening mail and making representations regarding the
integrity of goods offered for sale are essentially different. Article 2 recognizes
that difference and requires courts to acknowledge it in determining the responsibilities of transactors. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. Thus, the provisions afford
courts an opportunity to avoid making bad law when confronted by hard cases.
116. For a discussion of the impact of Karl Llewellyn on the development
of the Article 2 merchant rules, see Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules:
Karl Llewellyn~s Attempt to Achieve the Good~ the True~ the Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEo. L.J. 1141 (1985).
117. W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 336.
118. Legislation that vindicates the vested interests of one group to the
detriment of others affected by recurringr transactions will, if Article 4 provides
an accurate example, rely upon formalism, an inappropriate predisposition for
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supplies the method for discovering the proper balance of interests
among the various parties to typical payment transactions. 119
IV.

THE SALES LAW PERSPECTIVE: TORT ANALYSIS AND
DRAFTING WITH A Focus ON FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS

A.

The Relationship of Tort and Contract

It has become axiomatic that our commercial law is a
branch of the law of contracts. 120 The apparent close relationship between commercial law and contract law seems substantial, in part, because Article 2 of the UCC governs one type
of contract, the sales contract. Indeed, the superficial similarities between the two fields belie a fundamental affinity. Several provisions of the Code reinforce such apparent parallels:

a body of law that would recognize as its premise "'reasonable reckonability'
of outcome." /d.
The Code is founded not only on faith in the capacity of the business
community for satisfactory self-regulation within a framework of very
broadly drafted rules, but also on a faith in judges to make honest,
sensible commercially well-informed decisions once they have been given
some base-lines for judgment. Thus "reckonability" can be hoped for
if judges can be expected to act in accordance with business expectations;
uniformity within the leeway of broad rules will be promoted by uniformities of expectations, values and practices within the commercial
world.
/d.
One-sided legislation provides a poor model for subsequent codification
efforts. In the case of payments law, the financial institution power-play that
resulted in Article 4 has occasioned an equal and opposite reaction from the
representatives of consumer interests in credit card and electronic funds transfer
law. See supra text accompanying notes 63-84. Consequently, neither Article 4
nor the E.F.T.A. serves properly the interests of all affected transactors. The
chauvinism of both Article 4 and the E.F.T.A. renders them an inadequate model
for legislation that would endeavor to balance the interests of banks and their
customers.
119. See supra note 92 for a discussion of Llewellyn's approach to legal
realism as "method.''
120. It is not atypical to find that "Contracts" and "Sales" are taught in
the same first year law school course. Indeed, many professors of commercial
law also teach contract law. See Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's
New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11
Vn.L. L. REv. 213 (1966) (arguing that the U.C.C. has "mortally wounded" the
general theory of contract by replacing Langdellian formalism with Karl Llewellyn's legal realism).
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Article 2 contains a statute of frauds, 121 a parol evidence
121. Compare U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977) which provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies
the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given with 10 days after it is
received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received
and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are
for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement;
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted;
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606)[,]
with the 1676 Act for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Car. II, ch. 3,
III Stat. at Large 385, 386, which provides in part:
IV. And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That
from and after the said four and twentieth Day of June no Action shall
be brought [(1)] whereby to charge any Executor or Administrator upon
any special Promise, to answer Damages out of his own Estate; (2) or
whereby to charge the Defendant upon any special Promise to answer
for the Debt, Default, or Miscarriage of another Person; (3) or to charge
any Person upon any Agreementr made upon Consideration of Marriage;
(4) or upon any Contract [f]or Sale of Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments, or any Interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon any
Agreement that is not to be performed within the Space of one Year
from the making thereof; (6) unless the Agreement upon which such
Action shall be brought, or some Memorandum or Note thereof, shall
be in Writing, and signed by the Party to be charged therewith, or some
other Person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
XVII. And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That
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rule 122 a modification of the common law "mirror image" rule 123

from and after the said four and twentieth Day of June no Contract
for the Sale of any Goods, Wares and Merchandizes, for the Price of
ten Pounds Sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except
the Buyer shall accept Part of the Goods so sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the Bargain, or in Part
of Payment, or that some Note or Memorandum in Writing of the said
Bargain be made and signed by the Parties to be charged by such
Contract, or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
122. Compare U.C.C. § 2-202, which provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement[,]
with 3 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS § 573 (1960) (footnote omitted), which states:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate
integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of
antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the
purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
123. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207, which provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it;
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such cases the
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act[,]
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 60, 61 (1979), which state:
[§ 60] If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance
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and a provision that adjusts the preexisting duty rule. 124 Notwithstanding the contract law terminology employed, those vee sections are better understood in terms of tort rather than traditional
contract conceptions. Most of Article 2 lends itself to such an approach.125 Over a decade ago, Professor Grant Gilmore demon-

its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to create a
contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted place, time or manner
of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not precluded.
[§ 61} An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the terms
of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is made to
depend on an assent to the changed or added terms.
Comment:
a. Interpretation of acceptance. An acceptance must be unequivocal. But the mere inclusion of words requesting a modification of the
proposed terms does not prevent a purported acceptance from closing
the contract unless, if fairly interpreted, the offeree's assent depends on
the offeror's further acquiescence in the modification.
124. Compare U.C.C. § 2-709, which provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs
no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded,
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied
by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within
its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a
waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver[,]
with J. CALAMARI, CoNTRACTS § 4-7 (1977) (footnotes omitted), which states:
As a general proposition the courts have ruled that where a party
does or promises to do what he is already legally obligated to do or
promises to refrain from doing or refrains from doing what he is not
legally privileged to do he has not incurred detriment. The preexisting
duty need not be contractual. Thus, for example, if one promises to
pay his or her spouse a thousand dollars at the end of the year if the
spouse carried out the obligations of the marriage, the spouse would
not be entitled to the money because the spouse would merely have
performed a pre-existing legal duty. So also a sheriff may not obtain a
reward for the capture of a criminal if the capture is within the general
scope of his duties.
125. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 153-73.
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strated the consequences of what Corbin, 126 Llewellyn, 127 and even
Holmes 128 had appreciated years before, ''the fusing of contract and
tort in a unified theory of civil obligation." 129 Contract law replaces
abstraction for analysis; it is '''what is left in the law relating to
agreements when all particularities of person and subject-matter are
removed.'" 130 The area of legal analysis that focuses on the particularities, and indeed makes them determinative, is tort law . 131 One
well-read in tort cases would quickly conclude that the doctrine of

126. Arthur Corbin is generally considered an important precursor to the
Realists, due primarily to his interest in empirical, historical, and doctrinal studies.
See G. GILMORE, supra note 98, at 79-80; W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 27-34.
For example, these studies revealed that the formalistic contract doctrine of
"consideration" was not uniformly employed by courts in resolving contract
disputes. Indeed, courts often employed various theories of "estoppel" to enforce
promises that were not supported by consideration. See G. Gn.MORE, supra note
98, at 58-65. Such promises, of course, would not have been enforced under the
formal law of "contracts" and represented the existence of a "reliance interest"
enforcement theory operating outside the scope of traditional contract law. See
id. at 71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (providing for
promissory estoppel).
127. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM. L.
REv. 699, 713 (1936) (describing the regulation of commerce as a progressive
culmination of conditions, needs, and theories ranging from arm's-length transaction, tort, contract, res ipsa loquitur, and third party warranty to central
regulation by guild or state).
128. See O.W. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 13 (Belknap Press ed. 1963)
("But it must be remembered that the distinction between tort and breaches of
contract, and especially between remediesr for the two, is not found ready
made."); see also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality
and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 252 (1977), stating:
[R]ecent decisions sanctioning the award of punitive damages in contract
do not manifest much concern as to whether the plaintiffs claim falls
on the tort or contract side . . . . [IJt suggests that the most important
question ... may be not whether punitive damage awards are consistent
with contract damage principles, but rather, what is the likely effect of
the recent cases on the continued integrity of distinctions between contract
and tort, and what are the implications of undermining those distinctions.
129. G. GILMORE, supra note 98, at 90. Professor Gilmore stated:
It is not only on the products liability front that the erosion of the
negligence idea has been proceeding. Indeed the decline and fall of the
nineteenth century idea that tort liability is, or should be, based on
negligence or other fault matches the decline and fall of nineteenth
century considerationr and contract theory . . . .
ld. at 94.
130. /d. at 6 (quoting L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20 (1965).
131. The central concepts of tort law are foreseeability, the reasonable
person standard, and evaluations of proximate causation by reference to objective
criteria. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS §§ 43, 32, 42.
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stare decisis is respected more in the breach than the observance:
concepts and "limitations" of causes of action can only be understood by reference to the particularities, the idiosyncratic elements
that distinguish one case from another. 132 What "rules" there are
provide guidance rather than dispositive answers. 133
What really matters is this, that the judge is under a duty,
within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain
a relation between law and morals, between the precepts
of jurisprudence and those of reason and good conscience.
I suppose it is true in a certain sense that this duty was
never doubted. One feels at times, however, that it was
obscured by the analytical jurists, who, in stressing verbal
niceties of definition, made a corresponding sacrifice of
emphasis upon the deeper and finer realities of ends and
aims and functions. 134
Technical competence comes easier than the development of
good situation sense. However, the better lawyers and judges, those
comfortable with the Grand Style of legal analysis, would be
uncomfortable if constrained by statutory law that championed
form over substance. In the grand tradition of legal argument
''the rule follows where its reasons leads; where the reason stops,
there stops the rule." 13 s Justice Cardozo wrote disparagingly of
rules that would compel results without reference to reason. 136 He
was concerned that rules could mandate unconscious, mechanical
determination of results and acknowledged the "bulk and pressure
of the rules" that would inhibit the creative energy of judges.
Notwithstanding the tendency of legislatures to accommodate formalistic construction of statutes and the analytical jurists' preoccupation with the mechanical application of law to facts, responsible
courts and the attorneys appearing before them must innovate: 137

132. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 802
(1966) ("No one disputed that the 'warranty' was a matter of strict liability. No
one denied that where there was no privity, liability to the consumer could not
sound in contract and must be a matter of tort. Why not, then ... strict liability
in tort ... ?").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
134. B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 133-34 (footnote omitted).
135. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 157-58 (1960) (emphasis in original).
136. See B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 84.
137. !d. at 136-38.
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''within the confines of [remaining] open spaces ... choice moves
with a freedom which stamps its action as creative.'' 138 As in eating
a pair of shoes, indeed the best parts are the holes. 139 And the
holes are inevitable; 140 those inevitable gaps provide the stuff of
law, the material of judicial opinions.

B.

The Contrast Between Tort and Contract Principles in the

ucc

The Code's rules provide more guidance and certainty than is
available from the common law system of precedent. 141 Rather
than prepackaging an invariable conclusion to facts "marshalled" 142
in a particular way, Article 2 is drafted so that transactors' and
courts' conceptions of justice may be effectuated. 143 The "true
code" concept, 144 the elaborate definitions and thorough system

138. Id. at 115.
139. See Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv.
616, 634 (1949). In Fuller's hypothetical case designed to explore divergent
jurisprudential traditions, it is noted that the perspective of one of the justices
was similar to that of a man who ate a pair of shoes. "Asked how he liked
them, he replied that the part he liked best was the holes. That is the way my
[fellow Supreme Court Justice] feels about statutes; the more holes they have in
them the better he likes them. In short, he doesn't like statutes." /d. at 634.
140. See B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 16.
141. SeeK. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 62-63, concerning "The Leeways
of Precedents" in the common law system. Chancellor (then Professor) Hawkland
recognized that the Code addresses the shortcomings of stare decisis by requiring
courts to consistently refer to the statute and by distracting courts' attention
from case law under the Code. See Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292 (citing
Gilmore, supra note 110, at 1043).
142. "[T]he tort law . . . is relatively unimportant in most tort cases. The
successful tort lawyer has never been a specialist in law. His specialty lies in
marshalling and presenting facts." Hawkland, supra note 87, at 294 n.11.
143. Karl Llewellyn stated:
[A]ny reframing of particular legal doctrines, any addition to or clarification of the techniques of decision, must not only better serve control
of arbitrariness and guidance to justice, but must also satisfy men's
craving for reasonable certainty of form as well as substance, and for
dignity of process as well as dignity of result.
Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 CoLUM. L. REv.
581, 610 (1940) (emphasis in original).
144. See Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292, which states:
A "code" is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment
of a whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other
law in its subject area . . . . It is systematic in that all of its parts,
arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent terminology,
form an interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan and
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of cross referencing, provide the "certainty of form" and "dignity
of process" in the UCC. However, it is the language of the
individual provisions, the guidance of the comments, 145 and the
application of the Grand Style of adjudication that guarantee
"certainty of substance" and "dignity of result." The Code's
provisions work best when they reflect "a consideration of the
nature of the particular transaction as a practical matter.'' 146 Article
2 illustrates the efficacy of this focus.
The language of Justice Cardozo's tort analysis is familiar to
those who have focused their attention on sales transactions:
The master in the discharge of his duty to protect the
servant against harm must exercise the degree of care that
is commonly exercised in like circumstance by men of
ordinary prudence. The triers of the facts in determining
whether that standard has been attained must consult the
habits of life, the every day beliefs and practices, of the
men and women about them. 147

containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is
sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in
accordance with its own basic policies.
/d. (footnote omitted); see also, Alces, supra note 3, at 89, which states:
UCC drafters ... expended considerable effort formulating a jurisprudence of commercial codification and applying it to the provisions
of the UCC. Their perspective was founded on concepts of legal realism
and, as a result, they established commercial procedures that make the
UCC more a restatement of expedient commercial practices than an
effort to modify business custom.
145. Some writers have focused on the comments as a source of guidance
in resolving Code disputes. See, e.g., McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1978) ("The theory of purposive interpretation is rooted
in the concept of law as a means to select social ends-a method of social
engineering. It seeks to define legal standards in terms of the purpose they are
designed to implement."). Further, "the drafters' attempt to use the commentary
to facilitate purposive construction was linked with the underlying goal of
uniformity...• The official commentary indicates that, at least at times, articulated purpose is to control statutory text in Code interpretation." /d. at 800.
146. O.W. HoLMES, supra note 128, at 283. Holmes felt that "the most
important element of decision is not any technical, or even any general principle
of contracts, but a consideration of the nature of the particular transaction as
a practical matter." /d. Moreover, "[a]n answer cannot be obtained from any
general theory . . . . But the grounds of decision are purely practical, and can
never be elicited from grammar or from logic." /d. at 264.
147. B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 63.
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Likewise, "Good Faith" in the case of an Article 2 merchant
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 148 Indeed, there
may be no better example of the disparity between Article 2 and
the Commercial Paper/Bank Collections Articles than the "good
faith" provisions governing transactions in each Article. This
conflict depicts well the tension between the two drafting predispositions and biases as well as the political consequences of choosing
one style over the other. Section 1-201(19) defines "good faith"
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 149
This provision, the so called "pure heart-empty head'' standard,
is effective in all Articles of the UCC. Article 2, however, establishes
an enhanced, objective standard. 150 The focus on reasonableness
illustrates the influence of Llewellyn's legal realism. The intentional
exclusion of a similar provision in an early draft of Article 3
concerning holders in due course reveals the predisposition of those
who lobbied against it. 151 Although the objective standard may remain

148. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977).
149. Jd. § 1-201(19).
150. ld. § 2-103(1)(b) provides: "In this Article unless the context otherwise
requires ... '(g]ood faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
151. Professor Braucher wrote:
An early draft of the Revised Sales Act sought to add a requirement
that action by a merchant or banker, to be in good faith, be "taken
in reasonable course of business"; in early drafts of the Code this
became a provision that "good faith includes observance by a person
of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in
which he is engaged." The ABA Section objected that this language
was ambiguous and might be read to freeze commercial practices, and
the editorial board agreed to limit the general definition of "good faith"
to honesty in fact, using more specific language for any case where a
party was required to meet reasonable commercial standards. The result
was that such specific provisions were inserted in several places. Perhaps
most important was the provision in section 2-103 that throughout
Article 2-Sales "'good faith' in the case of a merchant includes the
observance of reasonable commercial standards," and the provision in
section 3-302 that to be a holder in due course of commercial paper
the holder must take "in good faith including the observance of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder
may be engaged.''
The provision as to holders in due course was perhaps the item
most vigorously discussed in the New York hearings. On behalf of the
Chase Bank it was said that it revived the rule of Gill v. Cubitt [3 B.
& C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824)]. The sponsors asserted that the
provision merely made reasonable commercial standards relevant on the
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in the commercial paper context by operation of the "notice"
provisions, 152 the fact that commercial reasonableness is expressly
made determinative in Article 2 but expurgated from the commercial paper setting corroborates the thesis of this Article.
Perhaps one of the best examples of what Llewellyn was
up to in his application of realistic principles to the law of
sales is found in the provisions dealing with tender, acceptance,
rejection, and revocation of goods-the UCC "Tarr"-Baby.JS3
issue of good faith, in accordance with precedent. A third view was
that it would be a rare case where the presence of the controverted
language would affect the outcome. The one case in which that language
was considered by a Pennsylvania court supports the third view; and
that view probably influenced the decision of the editorial board to yield
in Supplement No. 1 by deleting the reference to reasonable commercial
standards.
The New York commission approved the deletion of the reference
to reasonable commercial standards in the definition of holder in due
course. With respect to the comparable provision in Article 2-Sales, the
commission recommended that the definition of good faith be revised
to emphasize reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade rather
than reasonable standards of care. That recommendation was consistent
with an earlier suggestion by the ABA Section that good faith might
well include some element to "commercial decency" and with a reference
by the New York Court of Appeals to "the good old rule that there is
in every contract an implied covenant of fair dealing." The change was
made in the 1956 revision.
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REv. 798, 812-13 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
152. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(25), 3-302, 3-304. Whether a holder has taken
an instrument without notice of claims or defenses to payment on the instrument
is to be determined by reference to objective indicia. A holder has taken with
notice, and cannot be a holder in due course, if, circumstances surrounding the
holder's acquisition of the paper indicate that the holder had "reason to know"
of the existence of a claim or defense. Id. § 1-201(25). Several courts have
adopted the "inferable knowledge test" of notice. See, e.g. , Eldon's Super Fresh
Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207
N.W.2d 282 (1973); Mid-Continent Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Independence, 523
S.W.2d 569 (Mo. App. 1975); O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108
N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d 722 (1969). Another approach applies a "duty to
inquire" test. See, e.g., Winter & Hirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli, 122 Ill. App. 2d
372, 259 N.E.2d 312 (1970); Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219
Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal..Bank, 21 Cal.
3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978); see also W. HAWKLAND & L.
LAWRENCE, U.C.C. SERIES § 3-304:05 (Art. 3) (1984) (describing the inferable
knowledge test as the majority rule).
153. See Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The
U.C.C. 's "Tarr',-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 52 (1974), in which the U.C.C. rules
concerning tender, acceptance, rejection, and revocation are referred to acronymously as the "Tarr" sections.
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Consideration of sections 2-508, 154 2-601, 155 and 2-612 156 illustrates the style of Article 2. Section 2-601 is the Article
2 "perfect tender" rule. 1 57 The provision has received considerable attention in the legal -periodicals 1 ss as well as in the

154.

U.C.C. § 2-508 provides:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the
seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may
then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or
without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the
buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
155. /d. § 2-601 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections
on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole;
(b) accept the whole;
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
156. /d. § 2-612 provides:
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes
the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even
though the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate
contract" or its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment
and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required
documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection
(3) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must
accept that installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or
more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract
there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the
contract if he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably
notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to
past installments or demands performance as to future installments.
157. See Schmitt & Frisch, The Perfect Tender Rule-An Acceptable Interpretation, 13 U. ToL. L. REv. 1375 (1982). The perfect tender rule permits a
buyer to reject any nonconforming goods. However, the buyer's right to reject
is often limited by the seller's right to "cure" the defect as provided in U.C.C.
§ 2-508(2). See also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the
Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article
Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963).
158. See, e.g., Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments,
13 GA. L. REv. 805 (1979) (complex U.C.C. provisions concerning rejection and
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courts. 159 This fascination revolves around the ostensibly inflexible
language of section 2-601 and the creative interpretations to which
it has been subjected. The section seems to leave all the options
with the buyer; the right to reject arises "if the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract." 160
This statutory direction appears to permit little, if any, deviation
from absolutely perfect tender. Counsel would be reluctant to
advise a seller to assume too casual an attitude toward performance
responsibilities.
The language of the cases, however, betrays a certain vacillation
between the absolute direction of section 2-601 and the demands
of justice in the individual case. 161 A review of these cases discloses

cure have resulted in sliding-scale "substantial breach" test); Phillips, Revocation
of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 15 CoM. L.J. 354 (1970) (revoking buyer
must prove that goods are "substantially" defective whereas rejecting buyer need
only show that goods are nonconforming in any respect); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Sections 2-508 and 2-608-Limitations on the Perfect-Tender Rule,
69 MicH. L. REv. 130 (1970) (seller's right to correct defect in original tender
under § 2-508 and "substantial impairment" rule of § 2-608 limit the perfect
tender concept); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Seller's Right to Cure a
Nonconforming Tender, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 938 (1969) ("major-minor" defect
test does not incorporate seller's reasonable belief or acceptability, however, such
belief should be determinative of seller's right to cure nonconforming tender after
time of performance).
159. See McKenzie v. AlaOhio Coals, Inc., 29 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 852 D.D.C. 1979) (coal with ash content of 13.50Jo to 160fo nonconforming
when purchase order specified ash content not to exceed 7.5%); National Fleet
Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild, 450 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (buyer has
power to reject goods or tender that fail, in any respect, to conform to contract;
rejection is generally not available for goods or delivery that fail, in some small
respect, to conform to sales contract terms); Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp.,
99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 1093 (1982) (delivery of dump trucks appearing previously
used constituted delivery of nonconforming goods to distributor).
160. U.C.C. § 2-601 (emphasis added). Section 2-106(2) defines "conforming" goods as those that "are in accordance with the obligations under the
contract."
.
For court interpretations of conforming goods, see Irrigation Motor & Pump
Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483 P.2d 980 (1971) (nonconformity not a
question of quantity and quality of goods alone, but of performance of the
seller's entire contractual undertaking); Stockard v. Vernon Co., 9 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. (Callaghan) 1067 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (receipt of calendars six days late,
making timely delivery by plaintiff difficult, deemed nonconformity).
161. U.C.C. § 2-601 can be given a strict or relaxed reading. Therefore,
courts have had difficulty deciding whether it is a "perfect tender" or "substantial
performance" provision and have often conveyed the impression that the evaluation of the transactor's "bona fides" is a determinative factor. Movements in
the market price between the time of contracting and buyer's attempted rejection
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that, notwithstanding the absolute language of the provision, there
are enough loose joints in the Code to accommodate what Professor
McDonnell would refer to as "purposive interpretation" of the
perfect tender rule. 162 Several commercial courts have focused their
analysis on facts and equity to avoid a harsh result. 163 In so doing,
they have often reached the most commercially reasonable 164 result,
either by finding that the parties have "otherwise agreed" to less
than perfect tender, 165 or by invoking the section 2-508 cure provision.166 The limits of the right to cure have been described by

can also be decisive in whether the perfect tender rule is strictly or liberally
interpreted. See Envirex, Inc. v. Ecological Recovery Assoc. Inc., 454 F. Supp.
1329 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("substantial performance" rule incorporated into § 2-601
permits buyer to reject goods even for technical breach so as to require perfection
in buyer performance), aff'd, 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979); Jones v. Abriani,
169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) (mobile home nonconforming good
if fails to meet contract requirements and buyer does not forfeit down payment
pursuant to liquidated damages clause in sales contract unless perfect tender
made); Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975) (used
car destroyed by engine fire three hours after purchase deemed nonconforming).
162. See McDonnell, supra note 145.
163. See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. L.D. Pearce, 252 Ark.r 601, 608-09,
480 S.W.2d 133, 137 (1972), in which delivery of boat supposedly "identical"
to showroom model was a nonconforming good because of damage that occurred
during delivery. Seller's attempts to cure failed and consequently, the chancellor
determined the sales contract should be rescinded. In affirming the decision, the
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[w)hat constitutes a nonconforming delivery,
acceptance, rejection or revocation of acceptance are questions of facts." /d.
See also Clark v. Zaid, Inc., 263 Md. 127, 282 A.2d 483 (1971), in which the
court considered thr original quality, the nature and the extent of damage, and
whether the damage could be repaired to restore the original quality and appearance in determining whether the purchaser of dining room furniture rightfully
rejected the goods as nonconforming after their delivery in damaged condition.
164. See Whaley, supra note 153, at 54; see also Danzig, supra note 85,
at 632 ("Llewellyn's UCC Article II more often operated as a means of dictating
a method. That method was designed to prompt decision not according to the
letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic concept but rather according tor the
'situation-reason.'").
165. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas stated:
[I]t was the understanding of the parties, confirmed by the course of
dealings between them, that the time and quantities of the deliveries
and the variance in the sizes of the sheets of materials were not of the
essence of the contract. These matters were varied from time to time
as circumstances might dictate, and were not observed strictly by either
plaintiff or defend(!nt nor insisted upon by either.
Bomyte Co. v. L-Co Cabinet Corp., 40 North. Leg. J. 172, 182 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1968), afj'd, 217 Pa. Super. 811, 270 A.2d 253 (1970).
166. "Subsection [2-508] (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by reason
of a surprise rejection by the buyer." U.C.C. § 2-508 comment 2.
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reference to the seriousness of the defect167 and the expectations
of the rejecting buyer, 168 necessarily fact-determinative analyses. 169
Although the courts have applied the section 2-508 cure provision to less than "perfect tender" situations, the section 2-601
perfect tender provision makes no reference to the seller's right
to cure. However, in section 2-612, which governs breach of
installment contracts, there is an express reference to the seller's
right to cure found in subsection (2). 17° Comment 4 to UCC section
2-612 articulates the Code's approach to acceptance, in the context
of installment sales: "A clause requiring accurate compliance as
a condition to the right to acceptance must . . . avoid imposing
hardship by surprise and is subject to waiver or to displacement
by practical construction. " 171 It is not at all clear why this predisposition would apply only to installment contracts. Professor
Whaley has recognized the essential similarity of the section 2-601
single delivery, and the section 2-612 installment sales contracts,

167. See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 458, 240
A.2d 195, 205 {1968), in which an auto dealer attempted to cure tender of a
new auto that was rendered completely inoperable by mechanical failure near the
showroom. The court rejected the dealer's attempted cure because "for a majority
of people the purchase of a new car is a major investment, rationalized by peace
of mind that flows from dependability and _safety [and] [o]nce their faith is
shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an
instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired." Id. See also Bartus v.
Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1967) (plaintiff hearing aid manufacturer entitled to cure after its representative provided defendant with an
improved version of the hearing aid ordered).
168. See General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App.
630, 185 S.E.2d 619 (1971) (several month old auto that needed installation of
new springs, rear arm control, and new rubber bumpers did not entitle buyer to
recovery of full purchase price); Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln Mercury Co.,
209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) (loud noises from engine of new auto
easily corrected by tightening mounting bolts of drive shaft did not constitute
"substantial impairment"); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 461,
184 S.E.2d 722 (1971) (minor defects in new car not affecting operation and
costing only $80 to repair not substantial impairment in value to make car nonconforming, and possession of car for 3400 miles exceeded reasonable time for rescission).
169. See Whaley, supra note 153, at 57. Section 2-508 cure applies, by its
own terms, only to situations in which (1) the time for the seller's performance
has not expired, or (2) the seller has reasonable grounds to believe his nonconforming tender will be acceptable. While the first criterion might accommodate
certain, even formalistic, determination, the second one requiring an objective evaluation of the seller's belief, provides a way for courts to balance equities. See U.C.C.
§ 2.508.
170. See supra note 156 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-612.
171. U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 4.
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concluding that any distinction between the two ''is largely a
fiction. " 172 Comment 3 to section 2-612 advises that "the sense
of the situation [should] prevail over any uncommercial and legalistic interpretation." 173 In sum, there is little to restrain a court
that seeks to do justice when confronted with what would otherwise
be an uncomfortable tender and acceptance problem according to
formalistic "perfect tender" principles.
As demonstrated in the acceptance sections, Llewellyn enhanced
the effectiveness of Article 2 "rules" by setting the "words and
paper in perspective. " 174 Legal realism, with its emphasis on context
rather than dogma, was by no means an abdication of rules. At
most, Llewellyn's jurisprudence counsels a healthy "rule-skepticism."175 There is a tension, however, that clearly invites vigorous,
if perhaps naive, criticism: "flexible" rules may be tantamount to
no rules, and a commercial law system preoccupied with flexibility
sacrifices certainty and predictability . 176 Yet a realist's response to
criticisms of flexible rules would be that formalism, the alternative
to flexibility, frustrates and does not serve the interests of commercial transactors. A court confronted with a formalistic enactment will often reach what it deems to be the right result,
notwithstanding the pressures imposed by the letter of the statute.
Llewellyn's Sales Article proceeds from a different jurisprudential
perspective than that which guided the drafting of Article 4. The
reasonableness of the transactors' conduct, a tort concept, has
direct application in Article 2. However, its application is inapposite
in the law of commercial paper, at least from the perspective of
financial institutions. 177 Article 2 vindicates the conclusion that tort
principles provide the means to utilize flexibility as a constructive,
rather than disruptive, force in the commercial law . 178 Such flexibility provides a system of analysis in which facts are determinative,
rules are opportunities rather than obstacles, and commercial rea-

172. Whaley, supra note 153, at 53.
173. U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 3.
174. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 453.
175. See Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn, 1 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 441 (1974).
I
176. See Report of New York Law Revision Committee 28 (1956) (criticizing
a provision of a draft that relied heavily on principles of commercial reasonableness); cj. Leff, supra note 85, at 558 (concluding, with regard to § 2-302,
that "it has, really, no reality referent, and all of its explanatory material ranges
between the irrelevant and the misleading").
177. See supra text accompanying notes 149-152.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 85-118.
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sonableness facilitates situation sense and dignity of substance and
result. 179
V.

THE INTEGRATION OF PAYMENTS LEGISLATION:
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Any pervasive, preemptive effort to codify payments law will
fail without the acquiescence, if not active support, of the affected
interest groups. 180 Such support must not be obtained at the price
of unjust, and therefore, ill-reasoned resolution of trouble cases. 181
Expediency should be only a secondary goal. Accommodation of
opposing positions requires representatives of financial institutions
and consumer groups to abandon intransigent postures to advance
the commercial codification movement. They will all, certainly,
deny motivations that would hamper realization of the right and
just result. That is lobbying.
The Reporter of the U.N.P.C. project suggested that market
forces have already supplied the impetus for consensus. 182 That

179. See supra text accompanying note 143.
180. It was primarily the financial institutions' uneasiness with the perceived
consumer orientation of the U.N.P.C. that lead to the project's demise. See
Alces, supra note 3, at 89 n.21; see also Leary & Fry, A «systemsn Approach
to Payment Modes: Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J.
283, 286 n.8 (1984) (The 3-4-8 Committee asked its Reporter, Professor Scott,
to rework P.E.B. Draft No.3 of the U.N.P.C. and to "leave consumer protection
measures to federal enactments.").
181. The case of trouble, again, is the case of doubt, or is that in
which discipline has failed, or is that in which unruly personality is
breaking through into new paths of action or of leadership, or is that
in which an ancient institution isr being tried against emergent forces.
It is the case of trouble which makes, breaks, twists, or flatly establishes
a rule, an institution, an authority. Not all such cases do so. There are
also petty rows, the routine of law-stuff which exists among primitives
as well as among moderns. For all that, if there be a portion of a
society's life in which tensions of the culture come to expression, in
which the play of variant urges can be felt and seen, in which emergent
power-patterns, ancient security-drives, religion, politics, personality, and
cross-purposed views of justice tangle in the open, that portion of the
life will concentrate in the case of trouble or disturbance. Not only the
making of new law and the effect of old, but the hold and the thrust
of all other vital aspects of the culture, shine clear in the crucible of
conflict.
K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 29 (1941).
182. See Scott, supra note 18, at 792; Memorandum from Professor Hal
Scott to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 43 (June
15, 1983) (introduction to U.N.P.C., P.E.B. Draft No. 3).
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argument has been refuted from the clear perspective of hindsight. 183
Given the demise of the U.N.P.C. effort, it is easy to despair of
considering the codification of payments law from the perspective
of Karl Llewellyn's legal realism. Those who represent the interests
of financial institutions offer the bald assertion that what is good
for banks is ultimately good for bank customers. The representatives of the interests of financial institutions argue, essentially,
that we ought not complain of legislation that streamlines the flow
of payments and makes business easier for banks. Impediments
to the smooth transfer of funds would merely frustrate rather than
serve the interests of consumers. 184 Such unwieldy impediments
might be accommodated, but at a cost that would ultimately be
borne by bank customers. 185 This line of argument is provocative
but not entirely correct.
Imposing the costs of the stop payment "right," or any other
consumer protection measure, on financial institutions operates
much as would a tax. At first blush, the cost of a protection, a
tax-like cost, would appear, ultimately, to be passed to the consumer by financial institutions acting as mere conduits to transfer
the financial burden to consumers. This assertion, however, is not
entirely accurate: "[N]ot all taxes are borne by the supplier [bank],
nor are all taxes passed on to consumers [bank customers], as is
often asserted. Who bears the increased cost in what proportion
depends on the supply and demand relationships." 186

183. See Alces, supra note 3, at 101-03 (describing ther financial institutions
lobby's case against the U.N.P.C. and suggesting reasons for market forces
failure to accommodate the development of preemptive payments legislation).
184. See New York Clearing House, Statement on the Proposed Uniform
New Payments Code 13, 14 (Sept. 29, 1983) (elimination of Price v. Neal rule
would impair utility of checks because merchants would remain liable for length
of applicable statute of limitations) (on file at The Wayne Law Review).
185. For the argument that the expense of providing a right to reverse
payments would be shifted from financial institutions to consumers of financial
services, see Alces, supra note 3, at 110-11 (citing R. Brandel, Remarks at the
Uniform New Payments Code 1983 Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 1983)).
186. A. Al.CHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION, & CONTROL 66 (3d ed. 1983). If a bank attempts to impose the
full cost increase created by a new legal obligation on its customers, fewer
financial services would be "consumed." Any price increase decreases demand
and moves consumers up their demand schedule. The bank does not realize the
benefit of a higher price, only the detriment of a reduced demand. The amount
of the increased cost passed on to consumers, then, will depend on the slopes
or "elasticity" of the demand and supply curves. The more elastic the supply
curve, the more the cost that will be passed on. The market establishes the new
equilibrium; the discretion of financial institutions cannot.
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The consequences of this micro-economic reality are significant
for the drafters of payments law concerned about the relative legal
positions of banks and bank customers. It is inappropriate to
assume that consumers ultimately pay the full cost of all consumer
protection measures. If that were so, financial institutions would
have no reason to resist such measures. Consumer lawyers emphasize the disparity of bargaining power and conclude;
The law of [payment systems 187] should not be dictated
by bank technology, nor should the law conflict with banks'
reasonable use of electronic equipment. Rather, the law
should embody the fundamental principles to which commercial law 188 has always tried to be faithful, and bank
technology should have to find its place in the context of
those principles. Those principles allow customers to take
advantage of their rights as long as they conduct themselves
in a reasonable fashion. 189 Similarly, b'imks must behave in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards, using
ordinary care. 190• 191
The ''humanizers' approach to technology'' 192 reflected in this
excerpt is intriguing but provides little guidance. The further
"specificity" that the author offers is designed "to prevent judges
[and presumably jurors] from interpreting reasonableness in whatever manner conforms to their individual values." 193 Although the

187. In the original text, the author writes specifically about stop payment
law. His observations, however, may be applied fairly to the law of payment
systems generally. Prior to joining the Emory Law School faculty, Professor
Budnitz was the Litigation Coordinator of the National Consumer Law Center
in Boston, Massachusetts.
188. For discussion of essential or fundamental principles in the commercial
law, see Alces, supra note 3, at 91 (citing Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial
Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 365 (1952); Llewellyn,
Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 687, 696
(1948)). But cj. Scott, supra note 18, at 737 (asserting there is no jurisprudence
of commercial law) (footnote added).
189. U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406(1) (1977) (portion of original footnote omitted).
For the full text of the original footnote, see Budnitz, supra note 64, at 283
n.199.
190. See, e.g. , U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-103(1), 4-406(1), (3) (portion of original
footnote omitted). For the full text of the original footnote, see Budnitz, supra
note 64, at 283 n.200.
191. Budnitz, supra note 64, at 283.
192. !d. at 284.
193. Id. at 283.
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laudable terms of the commentator's more specific recommendations accommodate situation sense adjudication, 194 the formulation
is cosmetic rather than fundamental legal realism. It does little
more than substantiate the criticism of the UCC's common law
approach. 195 To understand legal realism in commercial code jurisprudence is to recognize that specification cannot inhibit judges'
and juries' reference to their individual values.
If market or other social forces ultimately lead to a new
comprehensive payments law effort, the frustrations and inconsistencies of the past commercial codification projects should provide a valuable lesson. Article 2 demonstrates what can work;
Article 4, the E.F.T.A., and the U.N.P.C. confirm that the lack
of a coherent jurisprudential perspective will undermine even the
most ambitious formalistic efforts. Rather than admonishing triers
of fact and law to do the reasonable thing, a hollow direction,
legal realism establishes a regime, a regularized practice that would,
through instrumentalist techniques, reveal the crucial situation
sense. This is a difficult, but indispensable idea:
[S]ince the ultimate effectuation of a purpose is in terms
of action, of behavior, the verbal formulation, to be an
efficient tool, must be such as will produce the behavior
desired .
. . . [O]ne of the statutory draftsman's major problems
is ... to make sure that his formula, when it becomes an
official rule, will not merely bask in the sun upon the
books. He must so shape it as to induce its application
196

194. See supra supra note 92 and the sources cited for a discussion of
situation sense.
195. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 85, at 627 ("The troublesome vacuity
of the unconscionability provision [U.C.C. § 2-302] underscores not only the
passivity of the Legislature in the UCC-Llewellyn scheme, but also the singular
difficulties that that jurisprudential approach has in dealing with issues involving
moral judgments."); Leff, supra note 85, at 488 ("One central thesis of this
essay is that the draftsmen failed fully to appreciate the significance of the
unconscionability concept's necessary procedure-substance dichotomy and that
such failure is one of the primary reasons for section 2-302's final amorphous
unintelligibility and its accompanying commentary's final irrelevance."). Leff's
article has been described as the "silliest of them all, considering the unconscionability issue. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.1 (1976).
196. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 452 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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The draftsman must induce compliance such that affected parties
order their affairs to realize the benefits conferred by the formulation. The only responsible way to determine the most proper
formulation is to observe the behavior of the interested transactors
and draft the law to urge them in the direction of that reasonable
behavior that would assure "certainty of substance" and "dignity
of result." 197 However, measuring all behavior by reference to an
undifferentiated and vague reasonableness standard is insufficient.
Although ultimately triers of fact and law will interpret the dimensions
of a particular controversy by their own sense of justice, the way
in which the governing legislation is drafted may structure their
deliberations.
Article 2, as demonstrated above, 198 incorporates the reasonableness analysis derived from tort law. It does not, however,
dictate that analytical method without elaboration. 199 Llewellyn's
legal realism consistently provides a means to supplant the formalistic strictures of traditional contract law with the fact-determinative, situation-specific approach of tort analysis. For example,
section 2-201, the Code's primary200 statute of frauds provision,
describes a procedure that merchants201 may utilize to avoid the
unjust results provided by the common law .202 No longer may a
merchant acknowledge with impunity his receipt of a written

197. See Llewellyn, supra note 143, at 610; supra text accompanying notes
143-46.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 153-73.
199. See U.C.C. § 2-508; supra text accompanying notes 163-66. The cure
provision works with the acceptance provisions of § 2-601 and § 2-612 by
describing the circumstances that lead to the conclusion that the seller should be
given what amounts to a second chance: either the time for performance has
not yet expired or the seller "had reasonable grounds to believe the non-conforming
tender would be acceptable." If one of the criteria are satisfied, imagining why
the harsh results of a formalistic "perfect tender" rule should be permitted to
frustrate the justified expectations of commercial transactors is difficult. Moreover,
the tender, acceptance, and cure provisions do not sacrifice the certainty of
commercial transactions or impair the expectations of the affected transactors.
200. Other Code provisions imposing a writing requirement are §§ 3-104
(Commercial Paper), 5-104 (Letters of Credit), and 9-203 (Secured Transactions).
201. See V.C.C. § 2-104(1).
202. See id. § 2-201(2). The full text of this subsection is reproduced supra
note 121. The subsection provides that a confirmatory writing sufficient to charge
the sending merchant will bind the addressee merchant if the recipient "has
reason to know its contents" and fails to return written objection to its contents
within 10 days. By providing that regime, the drafters permitted the parties to
a sales transaction to posture themselves in such a way that the equities would
clearly appear.
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confirmation and avoid enforcement of the contract because his
"signature" 203 is not on the piece of paper. Article 2 thus establishes
criteria that are consistent with general conceptions of fair dealing,
urging transactors and courts in the commercially reasonable direction.204
Similarly, section 2-209 is drafted to avoid the harsh application of the contract law preexisting duty rule. Although the
drafters limited the availability of contract modification mechanisms, they devised the waiver concept to invite courts to reach
the right result.205 Section 2-209 allows the equities to be adjusted
by the conduct of one or both the parties. Triers of fact and law
are thus left free to reach the decision to which they feel compelled,
without violating the statutory language. In addition, predictability
and certainty are not sacrificed because the provision mandates
compliance with particular requirements to support a particular
result. This would not be true had the drafters of section 2-209
merely directed courts to find for the litigant whose behavior
appeared most reasonable, based on actions of similarly situated
transactors. The provision avoids formalistic analysis by cataloguing indicia or badges of commercial reasonableness consistent with
our understanding of justice, instead of dispositively describing
what is and what is not reasonable. Article 2 works because it
guides rather than prescribes. The commercial paper provisions do
not share the same insight.
The inefficacy of the Article 4 treatment of the stop payment
"right" starkly contrasts the efficacy of legal realism in sales law. 206
The section 4-407 subrogation provision is a certain, albeit elaborate, device for financial institutions to impose a myopic view
of justice and commercial reasonableness on bank customers. 207

203. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
a present intention to authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(30).
204. See also id.§ 2-103(1)(b) ("In this Article unless the context otherwise
requires ... '[g]ood faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.'').
205. !d. § 2-209(5) provides:
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material
change of position in reliance on the waiver.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 19-33.
207. If a bank can identify a prior holder in due course, it may avoid its
obligation to its customer after it has negligently paid an item over a stop
payment order. U.C.C. § 4-407(a); see supra text accompanying notes 19-29.
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There is no room for "situation sense," no opportunity for triers
of fact or law to reach the right result. Holder in due course
status, a legal conclusion that has outlived its reason, 203 becomes
the means to arrive at an answer. A customer who has complied
scrupulously with the requirements of section 4-403,209 and may
very well be blameless in all aspects of the transaction concerned,
will necessarily lose to a negligent bank able to identify a prior
holder in due course. That has not always been the case210 and is
perhaps the best evidence that Article 4 owes little to Llewellyn's
legal realism. Although defenders of the commercial paper provisions
will argue the unique need for certainty, speed, and efficiency
dictated by the role of negotiable instruments in our economy, 211
that position has been refuted by commentators.212 The demands
for certainty apparently are not as great when financial institutions
would be subject to the inflexible aspects of formalistic analysis. 213

208. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 and sources cited in note
37.
209. See supra note 19.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 33-62 for a drafting history of the
stop payment "right" in Article 4.
211. It is axiomatic that negotiable instruments should be "couriers without
luggage." U.C.C. § 3-104 comment 3 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950),
reprinted in 10 U.C.C.: DRAris, supra note 31, at 319. The negotiability regime
and the holder in due course doctrine are designed to assure that instruments
will flow in commerce as expeditiously as cash, but with fewer security problems.
In a case that contributed significantly to the development of negotiable instruments law, Lord Mansfield emphasized the cash-substitute nature of commercial
paper. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B. 1758).
In commenting upon the efficacy of reversibility of payment provisions in
the U.N.P.C., Roland Brandel recently suggested that it would be more appropriate to burden the small claims courts with disputes concerning payment for
goods than it would be to burden the payment system, which puts a high premium
on certainty, finality, and celerity. R. Brandel, Remarks at the Uniform New
Payments Code 1983 Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 1983) (on file at The
Wayne Law Review). For a thorough description of the high-speed procedures
that banks utilize to clear checks, see M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 119-54 (1974).
212. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 401 ("In a number of situations
today, negotiability, and specifically the protection of holders in due course,
are not necessary or even helpful in fostering the flow of commerce."); U.N.P.C.
§ 103 comment 2, at 104-05 ("Times have changed since Peacock v. Rhodes, 99
Eng. Rep. 402, was decided by the King's Bench in 1781. Those parties to whom
checks are negotiated rely principally on the credit of the persons from whom
they take the checks, rather than on the credit of drawers."). U.N.P.C. § 103
would have effectively destroyed the negotiability and holder in due course
concepts in the context of consumer checks.
213. Although U.C.C. § 4-103(1) provides that "[t]he effect of the provisions
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Recall that the bank lobby resisted the application of an objective
standard in the original good faith element of holder in due course
status for fear that it "might be read to freeze commercial
practices. " 214 Also, the final payment provision of Article 4,215
arguably, leaves banks quite free to determine the exact point at
which their liability on an item matures. 216
Although other instances of the double standard assured by
Article 4 may be uncovered, perhaps the most revealing example
is the bifurcated approach to "giving value" for purposes of
acquiring holder in due course status. Section 3-303 limits the ways
in which a holder may be deemed to have given value to exclude
executory promises as well as certain commitments not directly
referable to the acquisition of the item. 217 Comment 6 explains

of this Article may be varied by agreement," there is little question that the only
"agreement" that might alter the provisions of the Bank Deposits and Collections
law would be the account agreement executed by a customer· at the time an
account is opened. There is no haggling over the terms of such agreement.
Professor Gilmore lamented with regard to the provision, "The only bright [spot
is} ... that a court, construing Section 4-103 according to its fair meaning,
might be disposed to hold the Article unconstitutional as an improper delegation
of legislative power to private interests ...." Gilmore, supra note 4, at 37576.
214. See Braucher, supra note 151, at 812 (citing 1951 A.B.A. SECTION
REPORT 126-28, 181).
215. See U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c), which provides that "[a]n item is finally
paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the following, whichever
happens first: . . . completed the process of posting the item to the indicated
account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith!' !d. §
4-209(e) defines "process of posting" as including "correcting or reversing an
entry or erroneous action with respect to the item."
216. See West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661,
155 N.W.2d 587 (1968), in which the court held that the process of posting was
not completed until the midnight deadline. The result of the decision was to
permit a drawee/payor to reverse a payment decision up to its midnight deadline
for any reason whatsoever. In fact, in West Side Bank, the court found that the
rules of the Milwaukee Clearing House Association could extend the midnight
deadline because U.C.C. §§ 4-103(1), (2) sanctioned the adjustment of that
deadline. 37 Wis. 2d at 672, 155 N.W .2d at 593.
The West Side Bank opinion has not been consistently followed by the
courts. For courts rejecting the West Side Bank analysis, see H. Schultz & Sons,
Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Community
Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 276 Or. 471, 555 P.2d 435 {1976).
Commentators have also questioned West Side Bank. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 623-24 (2d ed. 1980); W. HAWKLAND &
L. LAWRENCE, supra note 152, at § 4-213:04 (Art. 4) (1984); Malcolm, Reflections
on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 23 (1968).
217. U.C.C. § 3-303 provides:
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that the type of "irrevocable commitment" contemplated by section
3-303(c) as sufficient "value" would be an "irrevocable commitment to a third person, such as a letter of credit issued when an
instrument is taken.' ' 218 Less irrevocable commitments would be
mere executory promises, sufficient as consideration but insufficient
as value. 219
Contrast with sec~ion 3-303 "value/' the Article 4 "se_curity
interest" concept. Section 4-209 alters the section 3-303 value
determination by providing:
For purposes of determining its status as a holder in due course, the bank has given value to the extent that it
has a security interest in an item provided that the bank
otherwise complies with the requirements of Section 3-302
220
[
] on what constitutes a holder in due course. 221
The comment to section 4-209 explains that "[t]he provision is in
accord with ... Article 3 (Section 3-303). " 222 Perhaps from the

A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed
or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument
otherwise than by legal process;
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for
an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due;
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an
irrevocable commitment to a third person.
218. Id. § 3-303 comment 6.
219. See Bennett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 19 N.C. App.
66, 198 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 121, 199 S.E.2d 659 (1973) (§ 3-303(c)
contemplates simultaneous exchange· and does not include commitments made by
holder after acquiring instrument). "The commitment has to be of such a character
that it cannot be rescinded when the holder learns of a claim or defense on the
instrument in return for which the holder gave the commitment." W. HAWKLAND
& L. LAWRENCE, supra note 152, at§ 3-303:07 (Art. 3) (1984). Courts have been
disposed to find a holder's placing documents, instruments, or money in escrow
to be a sufficiently irrevocable commitment to constitute giving value. See Crest
Finance Co. v. First Bank of Westmont, 37 Ill. 2d 243, 226 N.E.2d 369 (1967);
Schranz v. I.L. Grossman, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 507, 412 N.E.2d 1378 (1980).
220. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) provides:
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
221. Id. U.C.C. § 4-209.
222. Id. § 4-209 comment.
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perspective of the Article 4 drafter, sections 3-303 and 4-209 are
coextensive. Consideration of section 4-208,223 however, supports
a less symmetrical conclusion. Professor Rosenthal, in his Article
describing the incongruities of the negotiability concept, illustrated
how the "first-in-first-out" rule of section 4-208(2)224 protects banks
in a manner not available to nonbank holders. 225 A bank, then,

223. !d. § 4-208. The tile of this section is "Security Interest of Collecting
Bank in Items, Accompanying Documents and Proceeds."
224. ld. § 4-208(2) provides:
When credit which has been given for several items received at one
time or pursuant to a single agreement is withdrawn or applied in part
the security interest remains upon all the items, any accompanying
documents or the proceeds of either. For the purpose of this section,
credits first given are first withdrawn.
225. Rosenthal, supra note 37, at 382-88. Professor Rosenthal's illustration
is as follows:
Suppose that an appliance dealer has $100 in his account on February
1st. On February 2nd, he sells a defective refrigerator for $500, and is
paid by the buyer with a check in that amount, which he deposits the
same day. On February 3rd, the dealer makes a number of cash sales
and deposits $5,000 in cash in his account. On February 4th, he writes
checks totaling $2,000 to pay his creditors, and they, having been worried
about his credit, promptly cash the checks at the dealer's bank. Meanwhile, the buyer has stopped payment on his $500 check, but the
depositary bank finds out about this only on February 5th.
If the provisional credit of the buyer's check is included until
revoked, the dealer's account as of the close of business on each day
was as follows:
February 1
$ 100
February 2
600
February 3
5,600
February 4
3,600
February 5
3,100
Even if the provisional credit for the buyer's check is not taken
into consideration, the dealer's account as of the close of business on
each day would have been as follows:
February 1
$ 100
February 2
100
February 3
5,100
February 4
3,100
February 5
3,100
At no point will the bank have taken the buyer's check into account
in permitting withdrawals; in fact, the bank was legally required to
honor the $2;000 in checks drawn on February 4th and would have
been liable for any proximately resulting damages if it had dishonored
them.
Despite all of these facts, the bank may well qualify as a holder
in due course of the buyer's $500 check. The reason for this is the rule
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without actual reliance on a check, may become a holder in due
course of the instrument while a nonbank transferee would not
because section 3-303 expressly excludes executory promises from
its definition of value. 226 This apparent inequity was not present
in the pre-Code law. 227
To discern the important commercial interest that might be
vindicated by the 4-208/3-303 dichotomy is difficult. Chancellor
Hawkland explained the commercial transactors' interest in certainty in terms of stability. 228 No apparent reason exists for concluding that section 4-208 better assures certainty in this area of
the law than does section 3-303. Seemingly, actual reliance, an
intermediate position between those assured by section 3-303 (executory promise insufficient) and section 4-208 (credit available for
withdrawal as of right sufficient), would best serve the interests
of commerce and justice. Moreover, imposing on banks the burden
of proving actual reliance would place no greater burden on

of first-in-first-out: section 4-208(2) of the Code provides that "credits
first given are first withdrawn" for purposes of the rule under which
a depositary bank may become a holder in due course.
/d. at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
226. "An executory promise to give value is not itself value .... " U.C.C.
§ 3-303 comment 3.
227. "Even where the credit is made without special contract that the credit
is only provisional, the bank does not become a holder for value until the
depositor has actually availed himself of the credit so given by drawing on it."
2 Report of New York Law Revision Committee 910 (1955) (citing National Bank
ofr Ashtabula v. Bradley, 264 F. 700 (W.D.N.Y. 1920); Bath Nat'l Bank v.
Sonnenstrahl, Inc., 249 N.Y. 391, 164 N.E. 327 (1928); Riverside Bank v.
Woodhaven Junction Land Co., 34 A.D. 359, 54 N.Y.S. 266 (1898)). "Paragraph
(b) of Section 4-208(1) goes beyond both the present provision of N.Y.N.I.L. §
350-b ... and the common law banker's lien in giving a security interest where
credit has been made available for withdrawal but has not yet been drawn upon."
!d. at 1344. Also, early drafts of U.C.C. § 4-208 did not provide that a bank
had given value by merely having given credit available for withdrawal as of
right. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-208 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), reprinted
in 10 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 505. U.C.C. § 4-211 of the September
1950 Revisions of Article 4 is the first instance in which the formulation of
current section 4-208(1)(b) begins to take form. U.C.C. § 4-211 (Revisions of
Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950), reprinted in 11 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31,
at 370-71. It was not until the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board
for the U.C.C., however, that § 4-208(1)(b) was finalized. The reason given for
the revision is "to reflect more accurately the self-:liquidating nature of a collecting
bank's security interest in the ordinary case where collection is effected." U.C.C.
§ 4-208 (1956 Recommendations of Editorial Board for the U.C.C.), reprinted
in 18 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 172.
228. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 293-99, 320.
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depositary banks than is currently imposed by section 3-307(3). 229
The continued application of double standards will frustrate efforts
to achieve the integration of payments law.
VI.

CoNCLUSION

Drafters must balance costs. They must determine whether the
benefits to be derived by consumer protection legislation are sufficient to justify the costs that consumers will be forced to assume;
whether the benefits of negotiability and the expeditious flow of
payments are overstated. The method of legal realism described
in this Article affords a proven frame of reference to guide the
resolution of those tensions. Consumer and financial institution
practices must be consulted to properly order the statutory checks
and balances designed to assure dignity of result. If, in reality,
banks do not rely on the creditworthiness of those who draw
checks to the order of their customers, the payments law should
not recognize and give effect to any fiction that assumes they do.
Likewise, consumers should not benefit at the expense of their
banks if, in reality, reimbursing the consumer for his bank's failure
to effect the stop of an electronic funds transfer causes the
consumer no loss. Subrogation theory is appropriate, but only to
avoid unjust enrichment and not to unfairly favor financial institutions. As this Article has endeavored to demonstrate, the resolution of the imbalance between proconsumer and profinancial
institution legislation often lies between the extremes established
by the two bodies of law. The electronic fund transfer law has,
to a considerable extent, been a response to the inequities perpetuated by the bank lobby's version of Article 4. By the use of
jurisprudential and historical analysis, this Article has established
a foundation for the codification of payments law. Concrete
proposals have been offered to provide an illustration of the means
of accommodation with regard to section 4-407 subrogation issues
and 4-208/4-209 value issues.
Before a comprehensive and preemptive body of payments law
will advance the codified commercial law, we must distill the
coherent compromise of interests from the incongruities produced
by the lobbying efforts of special interest groups. This Article
affords an initial, albeit modest, step in that direction. The drafters

229. U.C.C. § 3-307(3) provides: "After it is shown that a defense exists
a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of
establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a
holder in due course."
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of payments law should examine the Sales Article of the UCC to
facilitate. their efforts. Its vocabulary provides a useful prototype
and the more Llewellynesque provisions of Article 2 represent,
perhaps, the best application of jurisprudential principles to concrete "trouble cases."

